



ADA UNIVERSITY

BAKU DIALOGUES

VOL. 2 | NO. 1 | SUMMER 2015

***REFLECTIONS ON TURKEY'S PERSPECTIVES:
REGIONAL PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT***

Abdullah Gül, former president of Turkey

***TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY'S VISION OF COOPERATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CAUCASUS AND AZERBAIJAN***

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Round Table Discussion

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***25 YEARS AFTER THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL:
HOW GLOBAL POLITICS HAVE CHANGED***

Boris Tadić, Former President of Serbia

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AIMS AND SCOPE:

“Baku Dialogues” is a series of events featuring leading world personalities who will address subjects of current international interest by presenting their views and participating in discussion of these subjects with interested Azerbaijani and international figures. These presentations and discussions, along with other submissions, will be recorded in the “Baku Dialogues”, ADA University's new journal of record for academic and policy research.

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To submit an article, authors are advised to follow these guidelines:

We publish several categories of material. In the print magazine, comments are 2,000-3,000-word pieces that make a single, provocative point. Articles are more extensive 4,000-5,000-word pieces of analysis or reportage that comprise the body of the journal. Book Reviews are 2,000-3,000-word discussions of new books.

A summary of up to 200 words should be included with the article. A short one or two line biography of the author should be included. Submissions should be made by e-mail, in Microsoft Word format to the Editor.

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MESSAGE FROM THE RECTOR

Dear Readers,

In this edition of Baku Dialogues, we have focused on the evolution over the last 40 years of the political and strategic situation in Europe, which has come into focus once again with recent events in Ukraine. This year is also an important anniversary year for Europe, which helps us to understand the extraordinary evolution this region of the world has gone through in the last half century.

August 1, 2015 marks the 40th anniversary of the signature at Helsinki of the "Final Act" of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe — the CSCE. That event, which opened the way toward a lowering of East-West tensions and more normal relations between East and West, was made possible by the formal international recognition, at the highest level, of the possibility of peaceful changes of frontiers. This must occur "by peaceful means and by agreement," a clause which was personally and privately negotiated by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, working in close coordination with the West Germany Government, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The Helsinki Final Act also approved the notion of "freer movement of people and ideas," a key concept which permitted broader exchanges and, ultimately, the peaceful evolution of Europe and the end of the Cold War. The legacy of the Final Act of Helsinki is still very basic to the way European states, and the states from the former USSR, deal with each other, long after the Final Act was signed.

This year also marks the 25th anniversary of the signature in 1990 of the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe," the second key document in the development of what is now the OSCE. The historical changes in Europe during that period culminated with the reunification of Germany on October 3, 1990, so that Germany, which had been represented by two countries at the Helsinki Summit, participated in the Paris summit as a single country. The Paris Charter, signed at the summit meeting November 19-21, 1990, transformed the CSCE into an on-going organization — which became known as the OSCE — which then accepted the newly-independent states from the former USSR as full members during the following months.

These events, together, have had a broad impact on Europe and the regions of the former USSR, and are reflected in the presentations and discussions by political figures at ADA University in recent months. There has been much focus and reflection on what can and should be done in response to events in Ukraine, reminding us of the

OSCE's on-going inability to resolve conflicts in this region, including the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, despite the specific focus of the OSCE's "Minsk Group" for more than twenty years. The background of competition between the European Union and NATO, on the one hand, and a newly self-confident Russian Federation on the other, looms over these events, challenging statesmen as well as strategic thinkers to find workable solutions that respect the norms of international relations.

We are including in this edition of Baku Dialogues a brief memoire, looking back to the historic signing ceremony forty years ago in Helsinki, as well as some photos taken at that event. The impact of the "Helsinki Process" on developments in the region is also reflected in the remarks of the many distinguished visiting speakers to the ADA University campus who discussed or commented on the situation in Ukraine and the possible responses of the international community. These comments are of course the views of the authors, but they reflect the interest of people throughout the region in the "Helsinki Process" and its effects — past, present and future.

At ADA University, here in Baku, we watch events in the region carefully, and we also benefit from the perspectives of our many engaging speakers. Our students are keenly interested in developments in our region, with Europe to the West, Russia to the North, the Middle East to the south, and Asia to the East, across the Caspian Sea. We welcome comments and debate on these issues, and will be interested to hear your views

I hope all of you will find this edition of Baku Dialogues interesting reading.

Ambassador Hafiz Pashayev
Rector of ADA University

REFLECTIONS ON TURKEY'S PERSPECTIVES: REGIONAL PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

ABDULLAH GÜL

Former Turkish president Abdullah Gül is one of the country's longest serving politicians. He previously worked as an economist at the headquarters of the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah from 1983 to 1991, before being elected as Member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) for Kayseri for five consecutive terms (1991 to 2007). He was also a member of the Turkish delegation at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) from 1991 to 2001, working in the PACE Committees on Culture, Statutes, Politics and Economic Development.

In 2003 Gül became foreign minister in Erdoğan's government. During his four-year tenure at the Foreign Ministry, Gül focused on pushing forward Turkey's application for EU membership. He acquired a reputation as a skillful and nonconfrontational negotiator who was as popular with his staff as he was with his foreign constituents. In 2014, with his seven-year term as president coming to an end, Gül announced that he would not stand for a second term.

During his visit to Baku on 30 April 2015, he delivered a speech at ADA University. The Rector of the University, Ambassador Hafiz Pashayev, honored Abdullah Gül with an Honorary Doctorate diploma for his efforts to maintain peace in the world, and his contributions to Azerbaijani-Turkish relations, as well as his achievements in economic development.

REFLECTIONS ON TURKEY'S PERSPECTIVES: REGIONAL PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

MODERATOR'S INTRODUCTION AMBASSADOR HAFIZ PASHAYEV

Honorable Mr. President,
Members of Parliament, ambassadors,
professors, students,

We are witnessing a historical moment for our university. The former President of the Republic of Turkey, who is in Azerbaijan to participate in the Baku Global Forum, has accepted an invitation to our campus. He has also agreed to deliver a lecture as part of our Baku Dialogues series, regularly organized by ADA University.

Mr. President, I am very proud to welcome you to our university on behalf of our professors and students.

There is a strong strategic partnership between our two brotherly states, Azerbaijan and Turkey. There are many factors that unite us: history, language, religion, cultural and traditional values. Our commitment to strengthening our relationship is built on these values, and is the main goal of the foreign policies of both states. During the 25 years that have passed since the restoration of Azerbaijan's independence, we have demonstrated our dedication to these close ties. Azerbaijan has always felt Turkey's support in the political, economic and humanitarian fields. When

Azerbaijan was in the process of establishing its diplomatic missions in Washington and many other countries, Turkish diplomatic missions played an indispensable role. Joint economic, energy, transportation and academic projects have strengthened our friendship. The visit of President İlham Aliyev to Turkey and his speech during the ceremony for the 100th anniversary of the Canakkale Victory demonstrated once again that Azerbaijan and Turkey are committed to peace and security in the region. Azerbaijan is deeply appreciative of Turkey's support on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, and sees a major role for Turkey in the resolution.

We also have close ties in other fields, such as science and education. I visited several universities, including Bilkent and Middle East Technical University, during my visit to Turkey in 2010. We cooperate closely with Istanbul Şehir and Koc Universities. I would like to mention that most of ADA's leading professors are alumni of Turkish universities.

The role of President Gül in strengthening relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan is no secret. His 20-year political career is an exemplary model for aspiring politicians. Mr. Gül has served his country as a Member of Parliament, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister and finally as President. He is also the co-founder of

the ruling party of Turkey, the AK Party. Science and education have also played an important role in his life. After receiving a degree in economics from Istanbul University, he continued his education in the United Kingdom. In 1983 he received a PhD from Istanbul University, and lectured on international management and economics, also working at other universities.

Honorable ladies and gentlemen,

With great honor and pleasure I would like to present the decision of our University Senate. Abdullah Gül is acknowledged as an Honorary Doctor of ADA University, for his contribution to the development of economics, for his efforts toward peace in the world and to strengthening bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey.

**REMARKS BY
ABDULLAH GÜL,**

Honorable Rector, my dear friend Hafiz Pashayev,

Dear professors, instructors, diplomats, guests and students,

First of all I would like to deliver my gratitude and greetings from Turkey. I am very pleased to be with you at ADA University today. Before proceeding with my speech, I want to congratulate my dear friend, Rector Pashayev. Under his leadership this beautiful campus has been established and I believe as students you will make the most of the opportunities provided here. I would also

like to congratulate my dear friend, President Ilham Aliyev, and the Azerbaijani government, as I believe they have demonstrated great support for the establishment of this university.

I had the chance to walk through the Old City of Baku this morning. I already know the depths of this country's history, and once again, I have witnessed this today. Now, in this auditorium, I see the future of Azerbaijan: I see you, and I can see the success of the investment in you. This makes me happy.

Azerbaijan and Turkey are two brotherly states. We are two parts of the same nation; we have the same roots, traditions, and feelings. We share our successes as we share our sorrows. I have visited Azerbaijan several times previously, not just Baku, but also Sheki, Ganja, and Gabala, and I have also witnessed the development of those regions. But this time I came for a different purpose. I came at the invitation of the Nizami Ganjavi Center to deliver a speech.

I would like to thank Rector Pashayev and the University Senate for awarding me this diploma and for welcoming me to your faculty. Back in the 1980s, I was a faculty member, but I left to join politics. Now, after serving as a head of the state for seven years, I passed that post to my dear friend, and now I am serving my country in different fields.

Universities are always important to a country's future. When we say universities, we are talking about

universal investment. A country may have different resources - for example, Azerbaijan has natural resources - but everything starts with universal investment and human capital. Universal investment means highly educated, knowledgeable people. Universities are the places that shape the future of the country, and I see investments in universities as a priority. I often visit universities and talk to students, in Turkey and elsewhere. I am pleased to deliver a speech at one of Azerbaijan's most prestigious universities today. It is also important to note that the economic, political and educational progress of our countries is the main driver of development.

With great pleasure I observe that after 24 years of independence, Azerbaijan has seen great achievements in every field. It has become a center of politics and diplomacy in the Caucasus. Baku is a historical city. It hosted important cultures during 14-15th centuries and witnessed the first discoveries of the country's oil in the 19th century. Azerbaijan was among the first states to restore its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union and thereafter used its time very productively. I am saying this as a person who knows the past of Azerbaijan very well. Sometimes parents do not notice how fast their child is growing, but those who see them more occasionally are surprised at how fast they are growing up. This is true for me every time I visit Baku. I find it different and I feel proud. Azerbaijan has also achieved great successes in diplomacy. It has

successfully completed its non-permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council and regularly hosts cultural and diplomatic events. It hosted the Conference of OIC Foreign Ministers; now it will host the first European Olympic Games. Ganja was selected as a European Youth Capital. In 2010 Istanbul was also chosen as a European Capital of Culture. These are not easy events to host, and Azerbaijan's selection marks the power of its diplomacy.

We are seeing economic and infrastructural developments in Azerbaijan. There are significant regional and international projects. We have realized the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project, which transports Azerbaijani oil to the world via Turkey. These were once perceived as impossible dreams. Now, with the realization of TANAP, Azerbaijani gas will be delivered to Europe. Meanwhile, we are in the process of finalizing the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, launched together with my friend Ilham Aliyev. All these projects begin in Azerbaijan and go to Europe, drawing international attention to Azerbaijan.

Dear friends, given that we are in a diplomatic academy and I am a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, I would like to discuss the political processes that are taking place across the world. I want to start from the Caucasus. The reality is that we do not have peace and security in the Caucasus. The main reason for this is the occupation of more than 20% of Azerbaijani territories. Given the international recognition of the pre-

occupation borders and the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, this is unacceptable. We all have responsibilities towards the soonest possible resolution of the conflict. This will bring peace and stability not only to the Caucasus, but also to the wider region. Unfortunately, the OSCE Minsk Group's activities remain very low profile and this is not satisfactory. We observe double standards and sadly, the passivity of the international community implicitly supports the occupation. Given the reaction of the US and EU to Russia following recent events in Ukraine, the continuing silence on the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict diminishes faith in international law. That is why it should be our first priority to end the conflict and establish trust and stability in the Caucasus. No one should forget that there will be no economic development in a place where there is no trust. The fact that one state is rich does not entail security. As I mentioned earlier, Azerbaijan is developing fast, but in order for this development to reach the wider region and to position the Caucasus as a gateway rather than a wall between Europe and Asia, the occupation needs to be stopped. We regret that the UN and the international community are not prioritizing this issue.

When we look at the relations of the global powers with Iran, we see positive changes as a result of the nuclear program negotiations. This is in Tehran's interests. Although Iran is rich in natural resources, it has seen little in the way of technological innovation due to the sanctions. This has meant that it imports

gas despite its domestic oil and gas resources. That is why the resolution of the problems via diplomatic means should be appreciated. We hope this process will lead to eradication of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, because if one of those states gains nuclear power, it is inevitable that the others will also seek to develop nuclear capacity. It is like two friends walking together when one of them has a knife. You can never feel secure in this situation. We hope that diplomacy will succeed.

We oppose what is happening today in Syria and Iraq. We should learn from this; if leaders are not willing to consider their nation's demands, civil wars can ensue, and as a result states will exhaust themselves. Iraq is an oil-rich country, but the Iraqi nation has been living in misery for years. More recently, the more inclusive government has increased our hopes for prosperity in Iraq. But there are huge problems in Syria: 3 million people have fled their homes. Azerbaijan knows well what it means to be a refugee. There are 1 million refugees and IDPs in Azerbaijan as a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and we believe that the international community should focus not only on current refugee crises, but also on ongoing ones. Problems will be easier to address if we approach them together.

We also believe that diplomatic tools can solve the ongoing problems in the Mediterranean region. One of these problems is the Cyprus issue. Unfortunately, there are two separate communities in Cyprus, and despite all

our efforts to unite these communities, a solution has not been found. The Turkish community said, "yes" to the model proposed by the UN years ago, but because the other side rejected this formula, we could not reach peace. Until that point, everyone had been saying that the Turkish people did not want peace, but that referendum revealed the truth.

Turning to Russia, the recent events in Ukraine have reawakened Cold War sensibilities. This is a huge crisis that has caused the deaths of 5000 people to date. The annexation of Crimea constituted a violation of international law, and the fact that this act was committed by one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council is unacceptable. This threatens the integrity of the international system. As we all know, the 20th century was full of war and suffering, and a new international system emerged as a result, gathering together the lessons learned. Azerbaijan is a member of the Council of Europe, and Turkey is one of the founding countries - all these countries came together to protect human rights and democracy. They came together to prevent the catastrophes that took place during the two world wars from happening again. But as if we had not suffered enough, we now face new problems in this new century. Only 15 years have passed since the beginning of the 21st century, but these have been unforgettable events. We must address this, and the necessary steps for doing so are clear. Experience shows that states can develop only through achieving

public welfare, which depends on respect for basic human rights and democracy, as well as good governance. These can enable peaceful resolution of problems. Of course, there will be problems, but if we don't learn from our mistakes, these problems will reoccur. I am sure that as students of ADA University, you are well versed in history. We should learn lessons from history in order to prevent the re-emergence of the same mistakes.

We witness a great deal of suffering in today's world. For example, there are 2 million refugees from Syria that have fled to Turkey. All those people had lives in their own countries and now they are desperate. This is heartbreaking and can be prevented either by war or by diplomacy. Wars are always painful. Of course, every state should strengthen its military powers. I know that Azerbaijan is also building its military capacity and this makes me feel proud. Our military capacity is also increasing, but we should not forget that military capacity is for preventing wars, not starting them. We should prefer diplomatic solutions. For that we need educated people. Thus the establishment of such a university like ADA is of the utmost importance for Azerbaijan. What is also of crucial significance is that here we can see students from 32 countries, and faculty members from around the world. It is important for you to encounter other cultures, ethnic groups, and so on. The world does not only consist of people who were born in Baku or Ankara. There are different people in Africa, the US - and knowing different cultures will make you better diplomats. Today, no country can

exist in a closed environment. Today we are able to follow everything that happens in the world without leaving our houses. We see what happens in Nepal, we see riots in the US. You know what happens in Turkey. We should improve ourselves, open our minds and strive for accountable governance. As long as we follow these principles, all nations will be rich and satisfied. It is with great pleasure that I observe that Azerbaijan is following this path. I was happy to see cheerful faces during my tour in the city. I see diversification of the economy and industry. In particular, I am happy to see investment in education, because the future of all nations lies in the hands of the youth. I would like to once again express my gratitude to all of you and to wish you good luck! Thank you!

DISCUSSION

Amb. Hafiz Pashayev,
Rector of ADA University:

Thank you, Mr. President.

Your valuable remarks on our region and different countries are very important for our students. I would like to note one thing. Of course, our university has experience in hosting high-level officials, but this is the first time that we have hosted a former president on our campus. I want to thank you again for coming. Now let us proceed with questions from our students.

Mohammad Akhonzadeh
Student from Afghanistan:

It is a great honor to host you here. My question is about relations with Iran in light of the recent nuclear agreement. Prior to this partial rapprochement, did Turkey manage to maintain its relations with both the West and Iran? And what are the expectations of the West from Turkey regarding the increased pressure on Iran during negotiations? What about Iran's expectations from Turkey? Thank you.

Abdullah Gül:

That is a good question. It is important to acknowledge that historically, relations between Iran and US were not always bad. Under the Shah regime before that period, relations between these two states were very close. Iran was seen as a gendarme for the US in the region. On the other hand, it is also true that Turkey-Iran relations are very sensitive. I want to underline that the border between Turkey and Iran has remained the same since 1536, almost 700 years. This is of the utmost importance. Sometimes Americans ask me how Turkey has managed to maintain good relations with Iran and I tell them that our borders are older than the entire US. Thus, it is not easy to fight. Of course, we are different, we have different regimes, but we never interfere in one another's internal affairs. Stability and mutual respect in our relations serves peace in the region and in the world. We have economic

relations, we have cultural similarities, and most importantly we do not interfere in domestic affairs. There is major potential in terms of economic cooperation. We are neighbors and we act accordingly. Thus, we will not act according to the requests of the US or any other states. Of course, we have different positions with regard to Iran. We are part of NATO, but we pay special attention to our relations with our neighbors.

Ilaha Baghirova

BA student at ADA University:

Honorable Mr. President, I welcome you to our campus. I would like to ask you about the common strategic goals for Turkey and Azerbaijan in an environment where we face polarization and double standards.

Abdullah Gül:

I have touched upon this issue a bit in my speech. I have mentioned double standards and how the decisions by the UN and other international organizations are ignored. For example, on the issue of Ukraine we saw aggressive reactions, but when it comes to Nagorno-Karabakh and occupation of 20% of Azerbaijan's territories, we see silence. This is a double standard and I am emphasizing this lack of consistency. Turkey and Azerbaijan are together in this fight, because we consider Azerbaijan's problems as ours. Thus, we are committed to acting together in the future as well.

Rustam Tahirov

MA student at ADA University:

Mr. President, as we observe, the drivers of

economic development have changed in recent years. Developed and developing countries are forming models of knowledge-based economic development. This trend will be important for Turkey and Azerbaijan in the near future. What are the potential fields of cooperation in order to achieve a knowledge-based economic development model?

Abdullah Gül:

Thank you very much. Again, I mentioned education in my speech. An educated person should be able to adapt to a new environment. The world has changed a lot and today education has acquired a different meaning compared to 30 years ago. Even a year makes a difference. To educate people you need a knowledge-based model, because the future will depend on this. We need education and we need to cooperate in this field. Cooperation in the technical field will be especially useful. The establishment of common research and development funds is also important and we are collaborating on that. In Turkey we have these funds in the private and public sectors. We can launch exchange programs for our citizens to work in both countries. We should not only commit to supplying the basic needs of the population, but also focus on education.

Leyla Abbasli

MA student at ADA University:

Dear Mr. President, I am very pleased to welcome you to ADA University. My question is not about political issues. I

want to ask about your childhood. Did you have a particular ambition to become a national leader?

Abdullah Gül:

Turkey is a highly populated country, and has been a democracy since 1923. Since I was not born into a royal family, I could never have predicted that I would become President of Turkey. I worked really hard together with my friends. And if you work hard, you will get ahead. But let me add one more thing: I was born on 29 October, and this day is celebrated as the Republic Day in Turkey, and when I was born some called me “Cumhur”.¹

With the support of my nation I have served in different positions. This is an advantage of a democracy; if you work

hard and others appreciate your work they will trust you and you will find yourself in high positions. That is why you all should work hard and those who devote themselves to their country will be recognized.

Amb. Hafiz Pashayev:

Dear Mr. President, my wife also was born on 29 October, and when I was serving in the US, the Turkish Embassy always gave receptions on this date, and I would tell my wife, “This is in your honor, let's go!” – and of course I was saving money.

Abdullah Gül:

I wish all of you the best of luck. Thank you!

1. In Turkish, “Cumhuriyyet” means “Republic”. “Cumhur” reflects the people/public dimension of this term. The Turkish Republic was established on 29 October 1923, and it is on this day each year that the country officially celebrates the Day of the Republic.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY'S VISION OF COOPERATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE CAUCASUS AND AZERBAIJAN

MEVLÜT ÇAVUŞOĞLU

Mr. Çavuşoğlu is a founding member of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and was elected as Member of Parliament from Antalya for the 22nd, 23rd and 24th Parliamentary Terms. He was the Vice Chairman of the AK Party in charge of Foreign Affairs from January to December 2013.

He was elected as the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) during 2010-2012 and is the first Turkish parliamentarian to hold this office. He was granted the title of Honorary President of the PACE in 2014.

Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu served as Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator of the Republic of Turkey between 26 December 2013 and 29 August 2014. On August 29, 2014 he was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 62nd Government of the Republic of Turkey.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY'S VISION OF COOPERATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE CAUCASUS AND AZERBAIJAN

MODERATOR'S INTRODUCTION AMBASSADOR HAFIZ PASHAYEV

Honorable guests, Members of the Parliament, ambassadors, faculty, and students, welcome to this event.

Today we have a very distinguished guest; I am delighted to announce that we will be hearing from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu.

It is my great pleasure to welcome Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Baku, and to ADA University. We are much honored to host him today for the public lecture titled "Turkish Foreign Policy Vision of Cooperation: Perspectives on the Caucasus and Azerbaijan". We are grateful to him for choosing ADA University as a venue for public engagement.

Given that Azerbaijan and Turkey have a strong fraternal relationship as well as being strategic allies, the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister to our campus is long overdue. We are very pleased that the honorable minister will present his remarks here today. Minister Çavuşoğlu has enjoyed a long and distinguished political career. Having graduated from Ankara University, he later on went to New York, the London School of Economics and Bilkent University for

postgraduate education before embarking on his successful political career.

Mr. Çavuşoğlu has been a long-time friend of Azerbaijan, and I have met him personally twice before. The first time was a few years ago at a conference in Istanbul organized by the Atlantic Council, where we were on the same panel discussing energy issues in the region. More recently, I had the chance to speak with him in Ashgabat at the trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Turkmenistan. On both occasions, he impressed me with his vision and deep understanding of regional security, development and cooperation. He has supported Azerbaijan's agenda in the international arena, be it the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, where the honorable minister served as president from 2010 to 2012, or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM or Parliament) where the honorable minister served as a parliamentarian representing Antalya.

Words cannot fully describe the strength of the fraternal relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey. I remember just after Azerbaijan regained its independence, I was posted as Ambassador to the US, where the first real help in my work with the new

Azerbaijani Embassy in Washington came from Turkish diplomats and local Turkish communities. I had excellent working relations with all Turkish ambassadors in Washington throughout my long years in Washington. Our deep cultural and ethnic ties stretched far into fully-fledged cooperation in the fields of political dialogue, energy, economics, trade, regional peace and security.

But the best example of this cooperation is the partnership between universities and academic circles. When ADA was first established as the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, the Turkish Embassy in Baku was among the first to offer capacity building programs and faculty exchanges. Subsequently, I paid a special visit to Turkish universities in order to gain a better understanding of their academic potential and procedures. My visits to Bilkent and METU Universities impressed me greatly, in particular the METU Technopark. In that sense, we have much to learn from Turkish universities.

Today, ADA University has full university status, with four different schools. We have more than 62 students from 32 countries, including Turkey, on our campus. Together with Turkish universities, we are successfully implementing the Mevlana Exchange Program (funded by the Turkish government), conducting policy research, and engaging in faculty exchanges. Currently, several Turkish faculty and staff are employed on a full-time basis at ADA. Most of our faculty were educated in Turkey during the

difficult 1990's. Thus, Mr. Minister, I believe ADA University is the most natural place for you to address Azerbaijan-Turkish relations.

Honorable Minister, I am pleased to welcome you once again to ADA University, and hope that you will enjoy interacting with our students and audience. Once again, welcome - we look forward to your remarks.

REMARKS BY MEVLÜT ÇAVUŞOĞLU

Honorable Rector Hafiz Pashayev, Members of the Parliament, my parliamentarian colleagues, Ambassadors, honorable faculty, dear students: I am delighted and honored to be here on the occasion of my first visit to Azerbaijan as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. This morning, honorable President İlham Aliyev met us and we had a fruitful meeting with Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and Speaker of Parliament Ogtay Asadov. We discussed our bilateral relations with Azerbaijan and the issues that the international community is currently facing.

It is an honor to meet with you today at ADA University, a popular and prestigious university not only in Azerbaijan, but around the world - and day by day it is expanding and becoming more beautiful. I had a tour of the library before the meeting, and it looks like an enviable collection. I would like to deliver our gratitude to our elder in diplomacy Hafiz Pashayev for supporting and

developing a university of such high caliber. When we look across the region, we see that there are as many problems as there are opportunities. We see that those challenges and problems may have the capacity to overwhelm the region's opportunities and advantages. We live in the world where political and economic dynamics are rapidly changing, and in some cases, the emerging gaps are being filled by radical groups. How to enhance our capacity to combat these groups, and how to structure our cooperation in facing these challenges are two key questions. We should examine the countries that can withstand or overcome these challenges. The global economic crisis that took place seven to eight years ago continues to influence politics and democratic institutions. The reason why Greece is still negotiating with the EU the economic package is that like many other countries, it has not yet succeeded in overcoming the crisis. In this challenging context, Turkey and Azerbaijan have demonstrated their strengths.

Development in Azerbaijan is not limited to only Baku, but can be observed across all the regions. I am not saying this as a Minister of a brother state; this is my objective analysis. Today we see various types of development in Azerbaijani cities such as Ganja and Sumgayit, while Lenkeran, Shaki, and Gabala are rapidly

developing across all areas. This shows that Azerbaijan's economy is not based on oil and gas alone. If you have an economy based on a single sector, any changes in that sector will affect you. For example, the decrease in the price of oil has affected many countries; obviously Azerbaijan's economy will also be affected, but it is clear that Azerbaijan has the capacity to take all necessary measures in response. Turkey is also strengthening and maintaining its economic position despite the economic crisis, and has even demonstrated 5% economic growth.¹

Azerbaijan is following a diverse and effective foreign policy. It is pursuing an active policy in international organizations, expanding the number of its diplomatic missions abroad, and hosting a number of political, cultural and sporting events. We have begun to see that Azerbaijan's economic development is playing an active role in Europe and in the world, providing humanitarian and development aid to other countries. I would like to thank President Ilham Aliyev and everyone who has contributed to this development in Azerbaijan. We have worked together with Samed Seyidov in the Council of Europe. Ten years ago, there were perhaps one or two friendly states supporting both Baku and Ankara in international organizations. At that time, Turkey was defending Azerbaijan and we

1. Editor's Note: Turkey's GDP annual growth rate averaged 3.90 percent from 1999 until 2014, reaching an all time high of 12.60 percent in the first quarter of 2010. For this year World Bank has announced its prediction that Turkey's GDP Growth Estimate will drop to 3.1. Despite this, some economists believe that Turkey will achieve significant external rebalancing this year with the current account projected at 4.5 percent of GDP due to declining oil prices. See more: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/12/23/world-bank-lowers-2014-growth-estimate-for-turkey>

were doing our best to address all the challenges that were facing us. Today, I am delighted to see Azerbaijan's effectiveness in international organizations and its increased number of supporters.

Middle East: Reflections on the Past and Future

When looking at the array of global problems, we should emphasize the importance of staying strong, because the world is changing – in both positive and negative ways. But when we look at our surroundings, unfortunately, we see and feel those negative changes. In the wake of the Arab Uprisings, we see that processes in those regions are becoming increasingly vulnerable. In the post-Uprising period, with the 2011 Constituent Assembly elections, Tunisia managed to regain stability, but, unfortunately, the situation in the other post-revolution states remains of serious concern. Let me give the example of Syria. The regime does not have effective control of the state and is killing its people with chemical weapons and grenades, and by leaving them to starve. Neighboring Iraq also suffered at the hands of a regime that could not control the state, but with the establishment of an inclusive Iraqi government, things started to improve. Taking into account the overwhelming chaos in Syria, the main question is: Who is filling the power vacuums? The easy answer is terrorist

organizations. Today, everyone is trying to figure out how to combat Daesh² and other terrorist entities.

Why can't we defeat Daesh? Because we don't have a strategy for fighting terror and terror is not limited only to Daesh. I am talking about Daesh because it is currently the most brutal terror organization. Boko Haram kills 100 people a day. We don't pay attention to processes in Nigeria. It is dangerous to differentiate between terrorist organizations. We can't say that some terrorists are secular; others are Islamists; that one is good and the other is bad. Nor can we tolerate any terrorist organization just because it happens to be fighting our enemies. If we display tolerance, these organizations will attack us as soon as they can do so. Daesh is the best example of this. Some countries, notably the Syrian regime, supported Daesh from the beginning. Now look at Daesh: half of its weapons are from Russia and China; the rest are from the US. Where did they get them? They took Russian and Chinese weapons from the ruling regime, and the rest came from soldiers who left Mosul during the Maliki regime in Iraq. 70,000 people fled Mosul in a single day, because Daesh was coming.

There are humanitarian implications of this chaos. For example, 12 million people were forced to leave their homes in Syria. 8.5 million of them are IDPs,

1. Note: Turkey does not use the term Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); it believes this name falsely lends the imprimatur of Islam to a group that the vast majority of Muslims find despicable. Therefore Turkey uses DAESH- the Arabic acronym for "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham).

while 3.5 million people are refugees living in other countries. 1.7 million of these refugees are living in Turkey. Together with the people coming from Iraq, the number of refugees living in Turkey has reached 2 million. All of these people have needs in terms of education and healthcare. There are approximately 150,000 newborns, 240,000 children living in camps, the rest in different cities around Turkey. We have provided everything to those living in camps. We have built schools, clinics, hospitals; they have ambulances. But there are 500,000 school-age children and only 140,000 of them can continue their education, because they are living in different regions of Turkey. This is the consequence of the crisis in Syria. Turkey spent 5.5 billion dollars on humanitarian aid for refugees. In response, the international community has limited itself to saying "Good job, Turkey"; "You are doing great". What about sharing the burden? No. We took 130,000 people from the Syrian border town Kobani to Turkey in just one day. The number of refugees that Western Europe took from Syria from the beginning of the crisis is 130,000. Just 130,000... we accepted this number in one day and the financial aid we have received until now is less than 300 million dollars- just 265 million. I would like to add one more thing. European countries are choosing whom to accept, meaning they are trying to choose educated refugees; they discriminate against people on religious or ethnic grounds. Turkey has never discriminated against anyone. We accepted everyone- Armenians, Kurds, Arabs, Sunnis, Jews, Iraqi Turkmens, and

Yazidis. The cost of the Syrian crisis is too much for the region. So we are working on how to overcome terror and bring stability to Syria. There are more than 60 states working on this issue, but unfortunately, we have been unable to build a comprehensive strategy.

Thus, terrorist organizations rule over a large part of Syria and even Iraq. Looking to the region, we see that Libya is another problem; in Yemen, sectarian conflict has led to chaos. Oppression in Egypt is continuing after the military coup. Unfortunately, the area to our country's south faces serious problems. Indeed, it is not only the southern part - we face the same problems in Ukraine. Despite the two ceasefires and the Minsk agreement, clashes are still ongoing. People are dying. The officially recorded death toll in Ukraine since April 2014 has reached 10,000. Now the "foreign fighters" phenomenon is raising new challenges: combatants from Korea, Japan, the US and Europe are coming to Syria. There are Buddhists, Muslims and Christians among them. There are 35,000 foreign fighters from the Caucasus, Balkans, and many other regions.

We live in a strange world where radicalism is not limited to religion or ideology. We cannot see the reasons for radicalism, but there are 35,000 foreign fighters from different religions in Ukraine. The main question is what will happen when they return to their home countries after the war. Unfortunately, we can see what is going to happen. We have refused entry for 10,000 people to

prevent them from joining terror organizations in Syria, and have deported 1,100 people attempting to join the fighters in Syria. People who we have previously deported are then returning to our borders. How are they getting here, and more importantly, how we can stop them?

Signs of Cold War Period: Injustice in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

The legacy of the Cold War is both visible and palpable. When I was serving in Europe I observed that the Cold War had not truly come to an end, despite the fall of the Berlin Wall. The mindset was still prevailing. We can criticize Russia on the Ukraine issue, but we can also criticize Europe. I do not want to approach this question in terms of who is right and who is wrong. But if we continue to treat each other as we did during the Cold War, the crisis will not end with Ukraine, or with South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. First, we should resolve these problems. Today Ukraine is paying the costs of the clashes between the West and Russia, while some years earlier Georgia paid that cost. It is important to consider whether we may be re-entering a Cold War period? How far are we from a Cold War scenario? Our young diplomats need to think about this and come up with solutions. The current situation in Ukraine and Crimea is deplorable, because Russia is not fulfilling its promises. Meanwhile the number of IDPs is increasing, and there are 1.2 million people forced to leave their homes due to war in Azerbaijan. Our visit coincided with the anniversary of the Khojaly

genocide. We wish the mercy of God upon those 613 people who were killed, and to condemn the massacre. We will not forget this and will not let it be forgotten, and tomorrow we will commemorate our Azerbaijani brothers in front of the Khojaly memorial.

Is it only current processes that affect stability in Europe and the region? There are frozen conflicts today in Europe; including Ossetia, South Abkhazia, Transdniestria, Cyprus and Karabakh, and each of them is cause for polarization between East and West. Regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan's international legal rights are demonstrated in UN resolutions and other documents produced by international organizations. Armenia is not gaining anything from this unresolved conflict; it has become a victim of this problem. Yerevan is not capable of demonstrating its sovereignty. Did Armenia manage to sign a joint agreement with the EU? No. Why? Because of the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh problem.

Let's take the OSCE Minsk group, which is officially mandated to serve as international mediator on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. If they put all their efforts into resolving this conflict, they would pay. For example, those who accepted Cyprus into EU in 2004 without resolving the conflict there admit their mistake. Meanwhile, the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, as well as directly affecting Azerbaijan, hinders stability and peace in the Caucasus and the region. We want a peaceful solution -

this is one of the main principles of Turkish foreign policy as defined by Atatürk: peace at home, peace in the world. Today we follow the policy of “zero problems with neighbors” - but neighbors, and I am talking about Armenia in particular, should respect the territorial integrity of their neighbor states. We have demonstrated the importance of our relations with our neighbors. Despite some problems, our relations with Greece are developing in a positive direction and we have established a strategic working mechanism. We have the same mechanism with Azerbaijan. We want to say that Greece is not our enemy, but our friend. We may have some problems; we may think differently about Cyprus or have various confusions around the Aegean Sea, but we are neighbors and we want to maintain our relations at a high level. But our foreign policy is not limited to our neighbors. We want to increase the level of our bilateral relations with the help of strategic working mechanisms such as High Level Strategic Cooperation Councils. We have established these mechanisms with 19 states, including Azerbaijan, and are looking forward to establishing one with Georgia soon. We aim to ensure a visa-free regime among all states with which we have established the strategic partnership mechanism. In addition, we have launched a visa liberalization dialogue with the EU, which has been ratified by parliaments. We are trying to assure visa-free travel for our citizens to Schengen countries within 3 years, and

we want to abolish visa regimes with friendly states. Our Azerbaijani brothers travel to Turkey without visas, and we are negotiating the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens travelling to Azerbaijan, or at least to simplify the process. We understand internal and external balances surrounding Azerbaijan and respect its position. To date we have abolished visa regimes with more than 70 states.

Trade, Visa-Free Regimes and Challenges

The other factor is openness to trade. You produce goods and you have to sell them. In order to achieve that you need to sign free trade agreements. We have signed free trade agreements with 21 states and are in negotiations with 14 more countries. We are also discussing these agreements with international organizations. Meanwhile, we are trying to update our Custom Union agreement with the EU to open up new opportunities for trade.³ We have already reaped the advantages of these agreements: in the past decade our trade with neighboring countries increased to 90 billion dollars from 13 billion dollars with the help of these agreements.

I want to highlight our policy of opening up to Africa. Our trade with Africa has risen to 24 billion from 2.9 billion, and today we have 39 embassies in African countries. Turkish Airlines now flies to 42 destinations in Africa, and the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) has 9 offices

3. *The EU and Turkey are linked by a Customs Union agreement, which came in force on 31 December 1995.*

there. We are planning to increase the number to 11. In addition, the Red Crescent is in almost every African country.

I want to emphasize that another principle of our foreign policy is to expand our diplomatic presence around the world and to enter new continents. We have seen the advantages of this in Africa. Today we are one of Africa's three strategic allies; the others are China and India. We have prepared an action plan for 5 years in Equatorial Guinea and we are closely engaged in the problems of African states. As a result of our policy of opening up to Latin America and the Caribbean, the number of our embassies has risen to 12. With our new embassy in Fiji, we will continue our policy in Pacific Island states. We are also represented by TIKA and Turkish Airlines and many other respected organizations. In the case of earthquakes, the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey- AFAD is present; in case of humanitarian crises, the Red Crescent is there, while TIKA supports development projects. This support for development is another principle of Turkish foreign policy. Years before we were a state receiving aid, and our economy was not doing especially well. Azerbaijan should understand this very well, because their economy faced similar challenges. But now another similarity is that we have become countries that are able to provide bilateral aid. Our humanitarian aid across Africa, Asia, Pacific and Caribbean has increased from 1.6 billion USD to 3.3 billion USD today. Now we are in 3rd place in the world in this regard.

But when compared with our gross national product, we are in first place and we will continue our activities in the future. Today, with 228 missions around the world, we have rapidly ascended to 6th place, and we plan to expand this mission.

EU Integration policy, OSCE and Future Uncertainties

In this respect, can we say that Europe's integration policy is successful? No. Are international organizations fighting the environmental disasters that are causing widespread displacement? Do we have a successful model state on these issues? No. The economic crisis continues to affect the global economy. Do we have an international organization proposing an effective solution to this problem? And besides the economic problems, there are changes in the political balance as well. Today the balance of power in the world is changing; we see new powers emerging. By 2050, 50% of world production will belong to Asia. And if African countries continue to maximize their above ground and underground resources, including their agricultural potential, the total income of the African continent will be 45 quadrillion. In talking about emerging powers, we have to mention India, Brazil and Mexico. But do we see a satisfactory representation of these powers in international organizations? Unfortunately not.

Today, international organizations are not capable of solving the myriad problems that the world community faces. The Nagorno-Karabakh problem

remains unresolved after over twenty years. Why can't the OSCE Minsk Group solve it? Can the UN prevent all the conflicts that we see today? No. Today we chair the Forum on Fighting Terrorism. We are working on a strategy, trying to achieve peace - but which organization is effective in achieving peace? International organizations need serious reforms. When I was a candidate for the European Council Parliamentary Assembly Presidency, the first thing I said was that there is an urgent need for reform. No one believed me, but I explained why reforms are needed. As a result, we have formed an ad-hoc reform committee and together with General Secretary we have carried out reforms across the whole European Council and European Court of Human Rights. Why did we do that? In order to help that organization become more effective in problem-solving and to increase its visibility in transitioning countries ... And we opened the doors of the European Council to neighboring states. Today the Moroccan Parliament, Palestine and Kyrgyzstan are taking advantage of all the rights, with the exception of the voting right.

The UN and EU also need reforms. Today, the European Union is the most stable, most democratic and most developed region of the world. We accept that. But did they propose any solutions to the above-mentioned problems? No. Can their foreign policy be regarded as successful? No. What about its internal integration policy? It is also unsuccessful. We couldn't achieve a joint agreement on issues such as Schengen or the Euro. And the reason Ukraine is in the midst of this

crisis today is the failure of the EU's foreign policy. You cannot say to the countries in this region "you either choose me, or you are my enemy". Every state has its own problems. EU countries also have problems and differences in terms of democratization or economic development. This is no reason to classify them into first or second-class states. This needs to be changed. But how do we fight Islamophobia, racism, xenophobia and terror? Are we strong enough to protect the values in Europe that bind us together? I cannot see that. And why did we establish international organizations like the UN, the EC and other regional organizations? Because we paid a huge price during the World Wars, religious wars, regional conflicts. We paid a price in the Balkans, in Bosnia, in Nagorno-Karabakh. We have formed international organizations in order to avoid conflicts, to come together around economic interests. However, unfortunately, today we see few signs of those days. This is why international organizations and states need reform.

Some of you may say that I have focused too much on negative issues, discouraging us from diplomacy. But the view is not so bad. We just need to focus on the problems that our nations face in this region and in the whole world. We do have hope for positive changes. If we can act together like "one nation, two states" as famously stated by Heydar Aliyev, then we can resolve not only our own problems, but also those of other countries. Today Azerbaijan and Turkey are the center of all the major projects in the region: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, and

now TANAP. Today we are contributing to regional stability through trilateral working mechanisms such as the Azerbaijan-Turkey-Georgia, Azerbaijan-Turkey-Iran, Azerbaijan-Turkey-Turkmenistan, and now Azerbaijan-Turkey-Kazakhstan formats. We want to pursue all opportunities for cooperation and to be central to the project that will connect London to Beijing. We have hopes for the future, because now after those long years where Azerbaijan was behind the Iron Curtain, we are together. We have to understand the value of this. I gave some examples of states that are living in chaos and violence. We see these examples in our neighborhood. That is why we have to appreciate our stability and everything we have. Azerbaijan and Turkey will continue to serve as friendly states, eager to share our opportunities with everyone. This mechanism is beneficial to other countries.

I want to thank you all for your attention, and will be happy to answer any questions.

DISCUSSION

Amb. Hafiz Pashayev:

Thank you, Mr. Minister for sharing your valuable thoughts with us. Our guests know that Turkey's role in our region and in the world is increasing. My age allows me to compare how we looked at Turkey during Soviet times. Your analysis of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey-Azerbaijan relations, and the prospects for the future is extremely valuable for our

aspiring diplomats.

Rauf Binnetov
Kars University, Public Policy

Mr. Minister, thank you for your speech. I have one question. Last year in September at the UN General Assembly when talking about the reforms in the Security Council, President Erdogan said, "The world is bigger than five." What do you think of this approach?

M. Çavuşoğlu:

Thank you for your question. I have already mentioned that international organizations lack the capacity to solve the problems that we face today. When looking at the UN Security Council, established after World War II, we see that it does not reflect the current global dynamics. For example, the Dayton Agreement was adopted after the war in Bosnia and it limits Bosnia, so what should be done? It needs to be changed. There are 5 permanent members of the Security Council, and we have talked about emerging global powers. We have to apply, for instance, the D'Hondt to ensure equal representation. Today all the decisions are made through consensus, but if 1 of these 5 countries exercises its veto, then nothing can be done on that issue. This type of power is not acceptable and that is why this system has to change. The UN is losing credibility, and if it continues in the same vein it will share the fate of the League of Nations, established after World War I. All the continents need to be present. Today there are no countries from Latin

America, 3 countries from Europe, 1 from Asia and US. What about the rest of the world? What about Muslims living in Africa, for instance? Everyone has a right to be represented, including Muslims, Christians, Jews, and Buddhists. How can an organization that is not representing everyone reflect global realities? This is why we are saying that the world is bigger than five. This is why the UN needs to carry out reforms.

Question from auditorium:

As we know, Turkey will celebrate the Gallipoli (Çanakkale) Naval Victory on 24 April, and Armenia will hold several events on the occasion of the so-called Armenian genocide on the same day. Both countries sent invitations to the leaders of several countries, and I would like to know what position will Turkey take towards countries that choose to stand by Armenia.

M. Çavuşoğlu:

Yes, there will be two events on the same day: one in Turkey, the other in Armenia. But there is a significant difference between the two. One of them is attempting to distort history and is full of hatred. But the importance of the event in Turkey is that although we fought with powers seeking to occupy our land, it was a fight of gentlemen. We saw how soldiers from both sides helped each other even during conflict. They shared their bread, helped those who were injured. Now we will send the messages of peace and brotherhood that were established during the war, and we have

invited all the countries that were affected by World War I. There were Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Yemenis, Syrians, and many others fighting with the Ottomans. We reached out to Armenia as well, but as usual they rejected us.

Sayyad Farajov, BA student at ADA University:

Mr. Minister, you mentioned that Turkey ranks third globally in terms of foreign aid. But when I was in Turkey I saw many homeless people who live in heartbreaking conditions. Why don't you decrease foreign aid and direct this help to people in Turkey?

M. Çavuşoğlu:

You are right; there are many people in Turkey living in difficult conditions. Most of them came from Syria. We are trying to provide them with the necessary help. GDP per person was 2300 USD, but now this number exceeds 11,000 USD. Our economy is now larger; our social policies have become an example for other countries. Turkey's Health Minister receives invitations to multiple events from the World Health Organization and many other related organizations in order to speak about our health policy. We have merged social security insurance with health insurance in Turkey and the government pays the expenses of those who cannot afford treatment. Obviously, there are problems in every state, and Turkey is no exception. What I want to say is that, despite the cold weather, we rarely see

anyone dying from the cold in the streets. Our municipalities are really doing a great job in this regard, no matter which party they represent. These people are our citizens and local governments are responsible for them, so we have increased their budgets to better equip them to handle these responsibilities. I can talk a lot about our social policies, but the main point is that we cannot ignore people in Somalia by saying that we have our own problems. We cannot leave people in Africa dying from thirst, saying that we have to provide water in our own regions.

Azerbaijan also increases the number of aid to these countries and we have even discussed conducting joint activities in those regions.

Subhi Ismailzade
MA student at ADA University

My question is about Turkey's foreign policy. You declared the "zero problems with neighbors" policy several years ago. Taking into consideration the current situation in your neighborhood, can we expect a new strategy for Turkish foreign policy?

M. Çavuşoğlu:

Thank you for this question. I have mentioned the philosophy of our foreign policy before. As Atatürk said, we want "peace at home, peace in the world", but there was no peace at home. We had a military coup, executions, students killed each other, but now we are a stable country. We say "peace in the world", but

we had to intervene in Cyprus. Why? Because the people living there were facing oppression. This does not mean that we have changed our philosophy. We also had problems with Bulgaria, due to mistreatment of our citizens there. We are still following our policy of zero problems with neighbors. But let me ask you a question. Are we the reason for the problems with Syria? No. Did we tell Bashar Al-Assad to kill 300,000 people, to use chemical weapons? No. We said that the Maliki regime in Iraq would cause problems and we were seen as enemies. Later on the US - which brought Maliki to power - realized its mistake. We know the dynamics of this region. If a regime represents a sect, it will definitely cause problems. We are saying this because of the future of Syria, Iraq, and the whole region. We are not the reason for the regional crisis. We re-established our relations with Iraq as soon as the new government came to power. Armenia and Greece are also our neighbors. We managed to sign 16 agreements with Greece in one meeting despite all our problems. We were in Greece in December with 9 ministers. We have problems, we think differently, but we are trying to overcome those differences. To sum up, we are not going to open our border with Armenia, which is occupying part of Azerbaijan, on the basis of our zero problems policy. We want to have zero problems, and when Armenia is ready, we can take action together.

Lilioza Szylagi,
MA Student at ADA University

Mr. Minister, you mentioned that there is

increasing cooperation between Azerbaijan-Turkey-Iran and Kazakhstan. I would like to ask what has already been done in terms of commercial trade within this cooperation, and to hear your views on Turkey's role in the Trans-Caspian transportation corridor, especially regarding commercial trade rather than energy trade.

M. Çavuşoğlu:

Thank you for the question. When we were establishing these mechanisms, our aims went beyond gaining economic advantages. But the reality is that today, economic interests form the basis of bilateral relations and relations with international organizations. In our region, we have transportation potential along with energy potential. Today TANAP is a vital project that includes Azerbaijan and several European companies. TANAP is now a critical project in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, and it is now important to include Turkmen and Kazakh gas in TANAP. Turkmenistan has demonstrated its readiness in this regard; a trilateral meeting was held in Ashgabat. Close ties between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are emerging. Energy cooperation among these 3 states are also of interest to Europe. Yesterday we were in Hungary, and had a useful meeting on this issue. We are connecting Europe and Asia. We are working on a high-speed rail line that will connect London to Beijing. With the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars project, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey are forming the center of the region. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan also want

to engage in these mechanisms. Today Georgia's problems include the unresolved conflicts in Ossetia and Abkhazia, and there are two states supporting Georgia. We see the economic and political benefits of this mechanism, and we remain committed in this regard.

Question from auditorium:

The reason the EU is so strong in Europe is that it is a supranational organization, and member states are acting not in accordance with their interests, but in the interests of the organization. Are there reforms to international organizations that will take into consideration the holistic interests of the organization?

M. Çavuşoğlu:

I have mentioned the problems of the EU, but this does not mean that I am a Eurosceptic. I believe in the power of the EU and already mentioned my view of Europe as the world's most developed, stable and democratic continent. It has some weaknesses, as I have mentioned. But one of the main problems is whether it should be a federal institution or a more flexible organization. Some say it should be a political union like the US; others defend the view that it should protect the sovereignty of its member states. There are some members that defend their own interests and some that support the organization. Member states should understand that there are no differences between their own interests and EU interests.

Today there is a serious problem of the ageing population in Europe. There will be a rapid decline in the labor force in 20 years. We should also focus on security policy. If one state is not secure, then no state can be secure. This is true for the whole world, but I am talking about our region in particular. Another issue that frightens Europe is the flow of refugees. We are not afraid of this, and are accepting everyone coming to our borders. But they

are worried. So if they try to choose between national and EU interests, EU reform will be impossible.

Amb. Hafiz Pashayev:

Mr. Minister, thank you again for coming to ADA. I think we have analyzed our region in great depth and breadth, and I want to thank you on behalf of our faculty, students and our honorable guests.

UK FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

DAVID LIDINGTON

The Rt Hon David Lidington MP has served as Minister of State for European issues and NATO at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) since 14 May 2010. He was elected to Parliament in 1992, and was re-elected as the Conservative MP for Aylesbury in the May 2015 general election. He has held a number of positions including Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland from 2003 to 2007 and Shadow Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from 2007 to 2010.

UK FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

MODERATOR'S INTRODUCTION FARIZ ISMAILZADE

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen,
Good afternoon, dear students, Mr. Minister, Mr. Ambassador,

Welcome to ADA. As part of our Global Perspectives Lecture Series, we are honored to be hosting a very interesting guest. We are delighted that the Embassy of the UK in Azerbaijan has selected our university to host Mr. Minister. Today we are much honored to welcome Minister David Lidington from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He was appointed as Minister of State for European issues and NATO at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in May 2010. He is responsible for European Affairs and NATO, including the South Caucasus. Today he will address a range of issues concerning the South Caucasus and our broader region. Mr. Minister, there are lots of things happening in our region, most recently with the Ukraine conflict, coupled with developments in the Middle East. The UK as a global power and a regional powerhouse, of course, plays an important role. We are very interested to hear your views on these developments. Following your introductory remarks we will open the floor to our students and professors for questions. Once again, welcome to ADA University. It is a

pleasure for us to host you.

REMARKS BY DAVID LIDINGTON

Thank you very much for the invitation. It is a great pleasure to be at ADA today, and a pleasure to be in Baku, my second visit to the city. I think that as every visitor who comes to Baku infrequently, I am astonished by the pace of change that I've seen. A number of magnificent new buildings are now being rated as leading international examples of architecture, and I am glad to say that the British-designed Heydar Aliyev Center is breathtaking. So, it is good to be back, and it is good to be giving a speech at the Diplomatic Academy. UK diplomats have an excellent relationship with their Azerbaijani counterparts based on trust, respect, and honesty. I think this was particularly evident after Azerbaijan's election to the UN Security Council, when Azerbaijan and the UK cooperated very closely on a number of key decisions in New York. In the last year I have seen your professional diplomats, and Simon Crease visited your academy and delivered a speech on leadership. I am pleased to say that leadership is a quality that Azerbaijani diplomats clearly possess in abundance, starting from the line of the first-rate ambassadors that your country has sent to the UK. I had the pleasure of working

with H.E. Amb. Gurbanov for four years, and I am glad to continue this partnership with the newly appointed H.E. Amb. Taghizada.

When I was in Baku in 2010, I spoke at the Foreign Languages University about the long history of trade and travel between Azerbaijan and the UK. I emphasized then how important it was for the UK to have a close relationship with a strong and prosperous Azerbaijan. I am glad to say that in the last four years that relationship continued to remain strong; the UK remains the biggest single foreign investor in Azerbaijan, with Britain accounting for around half of all foreign investments in this country. Last year our exports to Azerbaijan reached almost 1 billion USD. And in return, Britain is the top destination for Azerbaijani students studying overseas. So we already have strong and vibrant relationships, which I am looking forward to developing further over the coming years. In 2010 I also talked about the UK's hope for peaceful settlement for the terrible tragedy in Nagorno-Karabakh. But Russia's interference this year in Eastern Ukraine, and its illegal annexation of Crimea, have brought back into short focus the continued unresolved conflicts in the South Caucasus, both here and in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We are reminded of the continuous need to resolve the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, and it is a matter for deep regret that four years on, on the 20th anniversary of the ceasefire, we seem to be a long way from a sustainable and agreed political settlement.

In fact, there have been more deaths this year than in any other since 1994. This is a conflict with great costs: lost opportunities, 20 years of continuous hostility, hatred and suffering. Every year both Azerbaijanis and Armenians die on the line of contact as a result of this ongoing conflict. Every year those who fled from their homes at a time of the war continue to suffer the anguish of living in exile. Many continue to live in very difficult conditions; hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis remain in internally displaced person camps, which I visited earlier today. The suffering of the displaced and dispossessed is a continuing reminder of the human cost. The divisions and the differences between the two countries and the two peoples seem to grow, and the opportunities for contact and the exchange of views, building of barriers across national lines seems to diminish further. Every year the possibilities to build a brighter future for this region seem to become yet more distant. A peace deal is not without the possibility of hundreds of thousands of displaced people being able to return to their homes. A peaceful resolution will be transformative for the South Caucasus as a whole, enabling the region to develop its full economic potential as a bridge between Europe and Asia at just one very simple practical level. The fact that you cannot have direct flights between Baku and Yerevan is an obstacle to international trade and commercial contact. Diplomats will appreciate that only diplomacy can bring about peace, and diplomacy can only succeed if those who disagree meet to

resolve their differences. It is something of a commonplace in diplomacy, but commonplaces are true. You have to talk to your enemies to bring about peace; there is no point in just talking to your friends. So, we welcome the recent meetings between President Aliyev and President Sargsyan in Sochi, at the NATO Summits in Newport and in Paris. Regular high-level meetings are one vital step towards building a long-term peace. And, of course, I personally, and the British government strongly support the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs in trying to achieve a long-lasting peace.

The Madrid Principles set out in 2007 provide the basis for a deal, but they involve difficult decisions and compromises for both sides. So, it is important that these principles are discussed more openly, both in Azerbaijan and in Armenia. The principles include the return of the occupied territories, surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, to Azerbaijani control. There can be no settlement without respect for Azerbaijan's sovereignty, and the recognition of the sovereignty over these territories must be restored. The enduring settlement will also have to recognize the right of all IDPs and refugees to return to their former places of residence. The Madrid Principles also set out that in any agreement the sides should also commit to determining Nagorno-Karabakh's legal status through a mutually agreed and legally binding expression of will in the future. In the meantime, under the Madrid agreement Nagorno-Karabakh should be accorded interim status, that

at the minimum provides security and self-governance. This interim status would be temporary, and there should also be a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno -Karabakh, wide enough to provide safe transit, but not encompassing the whole Lachin district. Finally, the Madrid Principles make it clear that the settlement will need to include international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation. There is no scenario where peace can be assured without a peacekeeping operation that enjoys the confidence of all sides. These are the elements of a deal, but the Minsk Group co-chairs and the broader international community only go so far; they cannot impose a solution.

Peace won't be possible if Armenia and Azerbaijan don't share the political will needed to reach an agreement. For as long as the conflict continues, Azerbaijani lands will continue to be occupied, Armenians in Karabakh will continue to live in an environment of uncertainty and insecurity, an inevitable result of living on a contested territory. And all the while the old Azerbaijani neighbors, colleagues and friends will remain displaced, and young soldiers and civilians on both sides will continue to die needlessly. I believe the time is long overdue for both sides to engage in serious efforts to reach a peace agreement. I am concerned that neither the government of Azerbaijan nor the government of Armenia is at the moment creating a situation in which a peace agreement would be acceptable to their populations. There is now a

generation of Armenians and Azerbaijanis that have had no contact with anyone from the other country. This is even more regrettable given that throughout much of this region's history, the two communities lived peacefully alongside one another, as indeed they continue to do only a few hundred kilometers away both in Georgia and in Iran. As time passes the danger also grows that the territories occupied around Nagorno-Karabakh are increasingly seen as integral parts of Nagorno-Karabakh, with the boundary line becoming increasingly blurred, making a future peace deal even more difficult. Unfortunately, the perceptions that many citizens of both countries now have of their close neighbors are based upon negative stereotypes and aggressive rhetoric. Neither government has yet done enough to prevent this image, and at times have actively encouraged these perceptions. This will not bring about peace or alleviate the suffering caused by the conflict; it only stocks further hostility between the two peoples, and discredits them among the international community. If the two sides are truly committed to finding a resolution, they should open up rather than close down communication and exchange between the communities on both sides. As a friend of Azerbaijan and Armenia this is the message I delivered in both capitals this week. I believe it is only when both sides are prepared to look at one another as potential partners, rather than inveterate foes, that this conflict can be resolved.

Over the last three years the UK has

invested almost € 2 million, and the EU a further € 6 million, in projects which try to break down walls and develop an understanding between the communities affected by the conflict. We believe that people-to-people interactions and the peace builders who sustain these links are an essential element of any peace and reconciliation process. We believe that this is the lesson to be learnt from other conflicts elsewhere in the world, including from our own the Northern Ireland. I think it is vital that international NGOs and local people continue to be able to work together on peace without fear of intimidation or harassment. The dialogues between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, between Karabakh Azerbaijanis and Karabakh Armenians, are crucial building blocks for a durable peace once the conflict is eventually resolved and these people are once again neighbors. We need to put people at the heart of the solution in Nagorno-Karabakh. I know that compromise is not easy and I recognize that finding a solution to this conflict will require courage from all sides. But as I said in 2010, some of the keys to future stability and prosperity include difficult decisions right now. I believe that now is the time to invest in peace. Thank you very much for listening!

DISCUSSION

Fariz Ismailzade:

Thank you, Mr. Minister, for these introductory remarks and some very important points regarding the conflict.

We now have some time for questions and answers, and I would actually like to start the Q&A Session myself. Mr. Minister, when people in Azerbaijan look at all the conflicts in the region, they see different approaches. For example, in the Ukraine conflict, and in conflicts in Georgia and in Moldova, we see strong support from the West for the territorial integrity of these countries. And while you have mentioned the sovereignty of Azerbaijan, nevertheless we see that international organizations and international resolutions state that this conflict must be resolved between the two sides. There is no strong condemnation of occupation, and somewhat vague language regarding territorial integrity. This is what disappoints Azerbaijanis. So, what can you say to an ordinary Azerbaijani about these differences of approach? Or maybe there is no difference of approach, just a communication problem. What would you say to an ordinary Azerbaijani about the conflict in Crimea and the conflict in Karabakh? To us they are the same.

David Lidington:

As I said in my remarks, it is matter of fact that territorial integrity is one of the core principles of the Madrid Principles and the Minsk process. The importance of this right goes back even earlier than Madrid, right back to the Helsinki Final Act. The principle of the territorial integrity of the European and Eurasian states was at the heart of the establishment of the CSCE, now the OSCE. The reality is also that alongside territorial integrity, Madrid also talks

about an expression of will. This means defining who should be taking part, when should it happen and what questions should be asked. Many of those things need to be worked out in detailed negotiations as part of a peace process. And again, this is not a new dilemma. Thinking of the arrangement eventually negotiated in the Northern Ireland conflict - I am not saying you can apply it to Nagorno-Karabakh, as every conflict around the world has its own unique properties and challenges. But sometimes you can look at the dilemmas that others have faced. What happened in Northern Ireland was exactly this. On the one hand was territorial integrity; the government of Ireland always claimed the territory of Northern Ireland, which had at one stage been part of a single kingdom. It then happened that the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland united in 1922, and most of that Ireland became a separate state, while 6 counties of Northern Ireland wanted to remain part of Britain. For years, the Irish government said that it was Ireland's territorial integrity, to be respected, whereas the UK said that it was actually the UK's territorial integrity that should be respected. We have a very complicated political structure now with a series of checks and balances, under which everybody accepts that Northern Ireland remains a part of the UK, but there is also a democratic mechanism allowing for change to this settlement through a referendum. If at some stage in the future the majority of people in Northern Ireland decide they want to join the Irish Republic, there is a mechanism for a change of sovereignty.

However, all the community protections, the rights of minorities, the devolved system of government, and the power-sharing that exists now in Northern Ireland, as part of the UK, would continue to exist. That is the decision we arrived at for Northern Ireland alongside giving people living there the right to decide their citizenship for themselves, on an individual basis. I am not saying that these precise tools will help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But it is important to acknowledge shared experience - we have had to wrestle with precisely these dilemmas ourselves, and so have other parts of the world. Both principles now have to be reconciled if we want an enduring peace.

Anar Valiyev,
Associate Professor of ADA University:

Thank you very much. Just to follow Fariz Ismailzade's question, and to play devil's advocate, it didn't take long before the Western community understood Russia's was intervening in Ukraine, especially in the Donbass area. It took two or three months to come up with sanctions against Russia, demonstrating the importance of compliance with the international legal system. More than 20 years have passed since the territories of Azerbaijan were occupied by Armenia, but there have been no sanctions, no signs of pressure. Do you believe that sanctions against the aggressor, be it Russia or Armenia or anybody else, can bring the peace and compel compliance with international law?

David Lidington:

I think that sanctions are a tool, though not a panacea; they are not a substitute for a political-diplomatic process for resolution. In the case of Ukraine this took several months for two reasons. First, I think, because from the start of this year there was a great reluctance in European capitals to believe that Russia was going to be as aggressive as she has turned out to be. There was a belief that we were living alongside a Russia that was gradually moving towards being a participant of a rule-based international system, with membership of the G8, the WTO, OECD and so on. At the beginning of the year there was hope that Russia would take the opportunity to pull back without losing face. Now, as we all know, that did not happen. The annexation of Crimea broke the Helsinki Final Act, the terms of bilateral treaty between Russia and Ukraine, the Budapest Memorandum (1994), and that was the point at which people said that this behavior was unacceptable. Sanctions were introduced partly to show that we were not going to let the annexation of the territory simply pass by with the shrug of the shoulders, but also as an attempt to deter further action. Now no one can prove what would have happened in the absence of sanctions; would Putin have gone further into Eastern Ukraine and Donetsk and Lughansk? Nobody knows that. But those were the motivations. Whether something similar should have been done 20 years ago is something historians will comment on. Looking at the situation today, the Karabakh

challenge is about starting a detailed process of peace building and negotiation. There were no prospects that Armenia was going to send troops into other parts of Azerbaijan; now it is about using the diplomatic tools available, persuading people to really work for negotiated peace. And I think that the Minsk group is the best form we have available when trying to do that. The international community needs to inject more energy into the Minsk process.

Question from auditorium:

Mr. Minister, what is the difference between the independence of Kosovo, when people from Kosovo say they want to be independent, and Crimea, when people say they want to be independent?

Fariz Ismailzade:

Thank you. By the way, Mr. Minister, the question our student is asking is in the minds of many Azerbaijanis - that is, by recognizing Kosovo the Western community has opened a sort of "Pandora's box" in regard to all these unrecognized territories who seek international legal status. Right after Kosovo's declaration of independence, Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In this sense, people are always sort of putting the blame on the West.

David Lidington:

I think they were completely different circumstances. Most obviously, in the case of Kosovo there was the UN SC resolution that provided a framework in

which people searched for political reconciliation between Kosovo and Serbia, and which also provided for the declaration of independence that eventually took place. Certainly our view is that the independence of Kosovo was consistent with the terms of the UN SC resolution. There had also been more than 10 years of attempts to find a political deal for Kosovo that would enable Kosovo and Serbia to stay together under some sort of political framework, and that proved just completely impossible. Now we have both Kosovo and Serbia moving towards EU membership. I think this is going to provide the anchor for a stable political relationship. It is not going to happen overnight. Serbia cannot seek membership before 2020, and Kosovo would be later still, as it is still a fragile entity where political institutions need to be further strengthened. But as both move towards EU membership, the border between them simply becomes less important. Ethnic Serbs living in Kosovo can think of themselves as Serbian while living within Kosovo's state jurisdiction within a European framework, still proudly serving their culture, their religion and their history. That's the best way to gain stability not just in Serbia, or Kosovo, but also in regard to all the other potential conflicts we still have in the Western Balkans at the moment. I think that the European framework is the best way in which to resolve those matters.

Lilioza Szilagyi,

MA student at ADA University:

You said that you believe in the Minsk group and its capacity to oversee the

process. Don't you think that the Group should undergo some kind of reform, particularly in relation to its participants, given that Russia has regional interests in this area? Russia actually sided with one of the aggressors, Armenia. Don't you think that it would be more efficient if the mediators were more neutral?

[Richard Sarpong](#),
MA Student at ADA University:

I read a publication in which the author argued that he was convinced that with the agreement of both parties, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the international community should intervene and let Nagorno-Karabakh vote in an independence referendum to be held five years after reaching a peace agreement. Do you agree that this would help resolve this problem?

[David Lidington](#):

On the question about the Minsk group: if we were starting with a blank sheet of paper today, perhaps we would invite Norway and Finland to come and try. I don't know. But let's look at the political reality. The Russian interest, and the Russian influence, particularly in Yerevan, is not going to go away even if we were to change the chairmanship of the Minsk group. This is the reality that we have to deal with, and the way the OSCE works is that there has to be a consensus for any decision. So, to change the composition of the Minsk group or to change the co-chairs would require consensus amongst all members of the OSCE. Frankly, I think that would lead us into another period of

internal arguments. I understand where you are coming from, but I assure you the best hope is for the broader international community to get behind the Minsk group and to encourage them to persuade the parties to look for greater sense of urgency in finding a settlement.

On Richard's question - the Madrid Principles, of course, do provide both for an international presence of some kind for the interim period, and they provide for an expression of will. But who are the people who are going to take part in that? If you went to Yerevan today, the people would probably say: "the people who are now living in Nagorno Karabakh." But put that question in Baku, people would say: "What about Azerbaijanis from Karabakh who were forced out during the war? Shouldn't they be resettled before we can even talk about votes and expressions of will?" I don't think coming from London I should say how this must be done. I think we need to get started on the process, and Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders need to sit down and thrash out what the very stages of this process are. I hesitate to use the word "roadmap", because you know that has other connotations. But a plan for the process and its stages is what we need to see. That is something that Azerbaijanis and Armenians have to sit down and construct with the help and support of the international community. But ultimately it will only work if both Armenia and Azerbaijan feel they have ownership of this.

[Fariz Ismailzade](#):

We have time for one more question.

Vasif Eyvazzade, from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

Vasif Eyvazzade:

Thank you, Mr. Minister for your interesting remarks. You mentioned Nagorno-Karabakh, and, of course, the people from there have suffered greatly. There are two crucial lines: one is occupation, and the second is the promotion and legalization of occupation in different forms. Recently at the Broadhead market in London, just two weeks ago, Armenians put up a stand for Nagorno-Karabakh, advertising it as a travel destination. But when we requested that the organizers remove the stand they said: "It is just business, we do not deal with political issues." If next year there is a stand for Crimea, what will the UK government do?

David Lidington:

The answer is that if it is a government organization, then we could do something about it. If it is a purely private organization, then this is not something that government controls. These are free institutions through which individual men or women express an opinion. There could be a risk of

prosecution if they argued that something was possible, say in terms of travel, that in reality was not possible, i.e. if they were giving factually incorrect advice. But it is a fact of life that the government does not have, and would not like to have, this kind of control. That reflects the diplomatic stance of the British Government. This is how our society works. So, what you mentioned – those were private companies. In a similar way, some British travel companies advertise the holidays in Northern Cyprus, which no British government has ever recognized – the so called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. We do not recognize its separate sovereignty, but British citizens do travel out to Northern Cyprus.

Fariz Ismailzade:

Unfortunately, Mr. Minister's schedule is very busy, and he has meetings with the leadership of Azerbaijan. This was a quick stop at ADA to answer some questions and to meet students. Mr. Minister, I would like to present you with a small gift on behalf of ADA. Please come back soon.

David Lidington:

I would like to. Thank you!

LATVIAN PRESIDENCY AND AZERBAIJAN'S ROLE IN EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION

On November 12, 2014, Latvian Ambassador at Large Juris Poikans, who is responsible for the European Union's Eastern Partnership at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Riga, and Dr. Andris Spruds, Director of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, made a dual presentation at ADA University on expectations for the EU's Riga Summit of May 21-22, 2015, and how the Latvian Presidency plans to develop the Eastern Partnership program. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan Mahmud Mammadguliyev, joined the discussion, making a presentation on Azerbaijan's relations with the European Union, including the Eastern Partnership. The discussion which followed included comments by Mr. Sahil Babayev, Deputy Minister of Economy and Industry, Mrs. Gulshan Pashayeva, Deputy Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, Mr. Cavid Veliyev, Head of the Foreign Policy Analysis Department at the Center for Strategic Studies, and Mr. Jeyhun Osmanly, MP of the Parliament of Azerbaijan, as well as students from ADA University. The discussion was chaired by Ambassador Hafiz Pashayev, Rector of ADA University.

LATVIAN PRESIDENCY AND AZERBAIJAN'S ROLE IN EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

REMARKS BY JURIS POIKANS

The core question of today's event is what we expect from the Riga Summit. I think this Summit is very important because it allows us to highlight the importance of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). It is quite difficult to get some of these issues on the agenda when there are EU countries that think differently; these diverse perspectives are sometimes in conflict. It is also important to note the progress that has been achieved since the establishment of the EaP. Sometimes we are quite critical about what has happened within the Eastern Partnership, but if we look at what happened between two summits- Vilnius and Riga- we can see that three Association Agreements have been signed with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. In addition, these are not just any agreements; these are three political agreements that entail a deep and comprehensive treaty area. Unbelievable development in terms of mobility has been achieved. Citizens of Moldova can now travel freely to the EU. I hope this opportunity will also be provided to Georgia and Ukraine, and in the future, to Azerbaijani citizens as well. I think the Riga summit will be important in terms of recognizing the differences among the six partners. We often hear criticism that EU is trying to impose a

single relationship model for all states. I think the Riga Summit will make it clear that we are building individual relations with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and others. I believe the Summit is also important in enabling partners to express their own concerns, because when you come to this region, you sense the importance of the issue of, for example Nagorno-Karabakh, for the Azerbaijani leadership and nation. The summit is another opportunity to express these opinions and to highlight their importance. The EU is a very complex institution, and the leaders of many EU states are dealing with a multi-issue agenda; in this regard, the Summit is a key opportunity for partner countries to express their opinions.

Latvia and Azerbaijan are very old friends, and from the European perspective, Azerbaijan is an important partner in the South Caucasus. Sometimes I think that we are overemphasizing the issue of the existing energy cooperation between EU and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan and EU relations are not only about energy, but also about political links. Azerbaijan is key to regional stability, especially when you consider the instability in the Middle East. Azerbaijan is a modern Islamic state that could and should be an important partner for the European Union. The country's support for Georgia

in terms of energy dependence is also very important. Thus, Azerbaijan plays a crucial regional role, and I believe this means that we need to work together. The EU and Azerbaijan must find a level of engagement that responds to the needs and interests of both parties. We must seek a new contractual relationship between the EU and Azerbaijan. When it comes to the notion of human rights, it is very difficult to avoid the fact that we have different understandings, and the issue of human rights is central to the EU. At the same time, we want to achieve a balanced relationship between the EU and Azerbaijan. However, it is obvious that when it comes to the issue of human rights this question will always be on the EU's agenda. Looking to Azerbaijan not only from the human rights perspective, but also from the broad regional perspective, I believe the Riga Summit could mark a turning point in EU - Azerbaijan relations, putting our relationship on a more solid foundation.

[Amb. Hafiz Pashayev,](#)
[Rector of ADA University:](#)

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I will now give the floor to Mr. Andris Sprüds, Director of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs.

REMARKS BY ANDRIS SPRÜDS

I am always very happy to be in Baku, and this is my second time in ADA, an institution I believe demonstrates the progress achieved by Azerbaijan. I think

the establishment of an institution with distinguished academics and modern facilities illustrates the strategic thinking of the policy makers in the country.

In discussing the Eastern Partnership, we can also mention things from our partners and refer to their experience. The academic community is a key component of society and it is important to reflect their views in evaluating and assessing international and regional trends. One of those trends has already been mentioned, regarding the EU's approach to the post-Soviet space and the events in Ukraine - which some refer to as "events", while others call it a crisis. In fact, Latvian people see this as a Russian intervention in Ukraine's political affairs. The transformation of the post-Soviet space and the developments in Ukraine are certainly geopolitical game changers, and I think we can talk about this phenomenon as the re-emergence of a Cold War ghost in the wider European area. This has the potential to shake the foundations of security in Europe. Now we are talking about what is next, and how to proceed.

Europe also has its own challenges. The Greek case is a clear indicator, especially in terms of economic sustainability. These events demonstrate the diversity of the wider pan-European region, and it is important to note this when discussing the Eastern Partnership. The Eastern Partnership does not exist in a vacuum; it exists in a particular geopolitical, political and economic context. The Eastern Partnership was essentially an

incremental technocratic undertaking, and now the Eastern Partnership has been caught in the crossfire of geopolitics, international challenges, and the ambitions of great powers. The geopolitical changes have influenced all of us; they influenced the Baltic countries and our thinking on security and the ways we engage with our partners. It certainly influenced the South Caucasus region. We perceive it as a region, and it is a region in many ways, but there are also elements of individual development that make it relevant to speak of regional fragmentation. Unlike the Baltics, the countries in the South Caucasus have chosen different paths of political and economic development. They are also different in terms of foreign policy. Georgia has chosen integration with EU, and has signed an Association Agreement. Then we have Armenia, which has joined the Eurasian Economic Union. And then, of course, we have Azerbaijan, which is self-sufficient in many ways and remains neutral. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between two South Caucasus states further complicates the picture. Furthermore, the regional expectations with regard to the Eastern Partnership are also divergent and fragmented. Georgia would like to see prospects of EU membership and increased security emphasis. Armenia is keeping the door open; potentially it can sign an Association Agreement without the free trade component, although this is not on the agenda of the EU. Azerbaijan has been less engaged in these activities, but of course, it is a very important

partner, especially in terms of energy. Where does the EU stand in this picture? As the regional context widens, the EU encounters a greater range of challenges. Generally, the EU is used to a regional approach, and this individual approach is in a sense a new adjustment in a recent years. Additionally, the basis of the Eastern Partnership, the Association Agreement, the Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreements, and the “take it or leave it” package have also put the EU in a difficult situation. And of course, it's not the easiest time for the EU to think about enlargement. Does this mean there is no search for an exit strategy? Moreover, there are a lot of countries, including Latvia, that are interested first and foremost in a stable and developed neighborhood.

Regardless of the various challenges, constraints, and mutual expectations, emphasis on values, stable and accountable government, support for civil society, and respect for political freedoms play a key role in engagement with neighbors. Of course, there is a lot to build on. Azerbaijan for instance is a strategic partner in the field of energy, but not only in that sector. Azerbaijan has made great progress in terms of economic development, and has the highest income per capita among the Eastern Partnership states. It is still possible to cooperate on economic diversification, regional instability, support for IDPs, and civil society involvement. We are thinking about possible upgrades to the strategic modernization partnership as a next step.

As a conclusion, I would like to quote London mayor Boris Johnson: “there are no challenges, just opportunities”. It is important to define the understanding among the EU countries not only with regard to the Eastern Partnership, but also in terms of their willingness to move forward in more flexible ways. This new thinking is reflected in different engagement with Eastern partners as well as Central Asia countries. Proactive engagement is important, but at the same time, the Eastern Partners take decisions in terms of how far they are willing to go. Political will remains important, though it comes with challenges on both sides. Of course, Azerbaijan is a very important partner. The EU understands the diversity of the region. Latvia realizes the importance of this heterogeneity.

Amb. Hafiz Pashayev:

Thank you very much, and I want to correct both of you. As of the beginning of 2014, we are no longer an academy any more, but a university – which also has students from Latvia.

Thank you very much to both of you for your interesting presentation. We will now have a discussion, but before that I would like to pass the floor to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan Mahmud Mammadgulyev.

**REMARKS BY
MAHMUD MAMMADGULIYEV**

Thank you very much. First, I would like to welcome all the participants of this

meeting and express my gratitude to ADA University and our Latvian partners for organizing this event to discuss the situation and relations between the EU and Azerbaijan, which started more than 15 years ago when Azerbaijan regained its independence. Azerbaijan has demonstrated its political will in terms of relations with the EU, and today Azerbaijan is ready not only to maintain this partnership and cooperation, but also to raise it to higher levels. Therefore, any external or internal speculation that Azerbaijan is not interested in cooperation with the European Union has no basis.

Our strategic goal is to bring and establish the best experiences and practices of the EU to Azerbaijan. In comparison with some other participants of Eastern Partnership, which are committed to becoming EU members, we believe that we should first implement our goal of bringing the EU experience to Azerbaijan. When Azerbaijan meets all the relevant criteria, then of course we may want to join the EU, or we may aspire to another type of cooperation and partnership with the EU.

With regard to the achievements in our relationship over the period since the Vilnius Summit: first of these is energy cooperation. We believe everyone here is already familiar with the Southern Gas Corridor. There have been two major events in the recent period: the launch of the Southern Gas Corridor in September last year and just recently, two weeks ago, the first meeting of the advisory

council, which aims to discuss the implementation of this project. According to our experts, the Southern Gas Corridor has the potential to deliver significant volumes of gas to the EU. Nonetheless, all the participants in this project should be prepared to respond to challenges at any time.

I would like to mention some other issues, including visa facilitation and the readmission agreement that has already been in effect for six months. We believe that it is time to get a review from the EU on how we are implementing it. At the same time, there is a need to discuss the questions around further issues related to the visa regime with the EU.

A mobility partnership is also in effect. We have already several members who are ready to work with Azerbaijan in this sphere. We also signed an additional protocol to our partnership and cooperation agreement on Azerbaijan's participation in EU programs. We have in some respects achieved our goal of bringing the EU's best standards and experiences to Azerbaijan.

The second question is the opportunities and challenges to the project and partnership. First of all, we would like to mention that we appreciate the EU's new approach. This approach is based on differentiation and it is the intention of the EU to thoroughly review the European Neighborhood Policy with close consultation with participant countries. Azerbaijan is ready to participate actively in this consultation, which we believe could reinvigorate our

relationship with the EU, because it will be based on the needs of the country, on geo-economics and geopolitics. At the same time, we should work on addressing barriers to our relations with the EU. Unfortunately, the EU's approach to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict causes big concerns in Azerbaijan. Today we have four conflicts: Armenia-Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia and finally Ukraine. As I said, there is a selective approach. In the case of three, namely, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, we see very clear, strong messages from the EU, support, respect and solution from the perspective of territorial integrity. When it comes to Azerbaijan, there is just the Minsk Group, and a "wait and see" attitude from the EU. This is unacceptable for Azerbaijan and this sometimes negatively influences our relations. We have raised this question several times, without result. We believe that EU involvement would significantly improve the status quo.

We are also unhappy with the attitude to the conflict in Crimea. Economic sanctions were immediately imposed. What is happening in Nagorno-Karabakh? We see numerous businesses from the EU countries in those occupied territories encouraging and financing the separatist regime.

I do not want to take a lot of your time, but I would like to reiterate that we believe that the EU should take measures against Armenia, because it's unacceptable that one Eastern Partnership country is occupying the territory of another. Instead of looking

for opportunities how to cooperate with Armenia, it would be more effective to impose pressure, to take measures against Armenia in order to liberate the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Regarding human rights, as my colleague from Latvia underlined, we also believe that this is a very important question. We are a young democracy, and you know that even developed countries are not immune from violations of human rights and democratic principles, but I don't believe that the policy of "naming and blaming" is very productive. We are ready for a bilateral dialog and we have a subcommittee within our committee of cooperation within the EU in which we discuss these questions. At the same time, we have many examples of violations of human rights and democracy in EU member states and other Western countries. But we don't believe that naming and blaming is the best way. Human rights and democracy are continuous processes. As you know, the European Union's special representative for Human Rights Mr. Stavros Lambridinis is in Baku today. Yesterday he was received by the President and other officials, and we have created opportunities for a successful trip to Azerbaijan. I think these questions should be settled through dialog, but not through making statements on every occasion. And these statements reflect information only from politically oriented groups. Unfortunately, nobody in the EU wants to listen to the opinion of the government. Someone says it is politically motivated, and immediately a statement is made by

parliament, etc.

Finally, we should decide how to expand our relations and partnership. We decided not to go further with the Association Agreement and with modernization. We believe it is time to sign a smaller agreement on a strategic partnership. We are already strategic partners in the energy sector. We have a memorandum and we are also strategic partners in fighting against terrorism. We are also strategic partners with several EU countries. Therefore we think that we deserve the right and opportunity to create such a document. This document is currently being finalized, and will soon be submitted to the EU for consideration.

Another issue is the EU's support regarding the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. We expect the same approach that the EU demonstrates with regard to Moldova, Georgia and now Ukraine. Finally, we believe that the Riga Summit should first of all concentrate on the issues of security, depreciation process, and review of Eastern Partnership.

Today, I would like to reiterate that we consider the EU as one of our most important partners for modernization and development, and therefore we are ready to cooperate, but at the same time the questions that I raised should be settled.

Amb. Hafiz Pashayev:

Thank you, Mr. Mammadgulyev, for your

very comprehensive summary of Azerbaijan's position on the EU. I will now give the floor to our adjunct faculty member, and political scientist Bakhtiyar Aslanbayli.

**REMARKS BY
BAKHTIYAR ASLANBAYLI:**

It is indeed a pleasure and honor to be a part of this dialogue today. I will concentrate on the future of the EaP and discuss what has happened in the past, and what the priorities of EaP countries were. But I believe the main question is how the program could be upgraded and reformed in a way to make it effective for all members of the EaP. The signing of the Association Agreement with EaP countries was a historic moment, unfortunately overshadowed by the situation in Ukraine. The creation of the EU Energy Union is just one step towards upgrading of those relationships. I would like to quote Mr. Barroso's speech at the EU Association Agreement summit. Mr. Barroso said that the signing of the Association Agreements shouldn't be seen as the end of the road, but as the beginning of a journey on which the EU and those partners were embarking together.

In order to have the best possible outcome from the Riga Summit in May, it is time for both sides, the EU and EaP countries, to generate serious thinking about the substance and future of the EP program. There should be a clear signal that the EU will take a more individualistic approach to these countries. It should be noted that not all

the countries want to join the EU, and that choice should be respected. There is also a need to review the EaP dating back to 2009. There should be a more tailored approach. From that perspective, changes can be made in four main areas. First, the EU needs to outline a new understanding of the nation state for cooperation with EaP countries. It should be based on the idea of a unified Europe that can stand together on various challenges. States should be treated as equal partners, not as the lower level states as we can see in some cases.

Second, the EU needs to support a people-to-people program. Notwithstanding the different political agendas in the various EaP countries, overall the EP citizens tend to support western development and western integration. Engaging more with European citizens, focusing on youth problems, scholarships, and support for civil society projects is of the utmost importance. This links up with visa mobilization; Brussels should encourage a bottom up approach.

Third, double standards have undermined the EU's position as an honest actor. Mr. Deputy Minister already talked about the selective approach and I don't want to concentrate too much on that, but obviously a consistent approach towards conflicts and protection of territorial integrity is important.

Finally, we sometimes see "now or never" language, and this is not a sustainable approach. Overall, I believe Riga the Summit is an opportunity to change and upgrade the EaP program, to focus, to

differentiate and to engage. With these points in mind, the Riga summit will definitely be successful and have a positive outcome.

Thank you.

Amb. Hafiz Pashayev:

Thank you, Mr. Aslanbeyli.

Most of the speakers mentioned that now there is a move to change the regional approach to an individualized approach. I recall from my own experience that in the West, big entities like the EU and US were working on policy papers. They would like to bring together countries and to present specific policies on that country. This happened with GUAM. The US used the example of the Baltic States to show how some small countries could achieve their goals through a unifying policy or project. Unfortunately, the Caucasus could not adopt this type of approach, because while geographically it was one area, in political terms it was very different. It's good to know that Riga might give new impetus to this approach.

Therefore, before proceeding to discussions, I would like to give the floor to one more speaker. Mr Sahil Babayev, Deputy Minister of Industry and Economic Development.

**INTERVENTION BY
SAHIL BABAYEV**

Deputy Minister of Economy and Industry of Azerbaijan:

Thank you, dear rector. First of all, I would like to express our gratitude to ADA

University and the Latvian delegation for organizing this event and for inviting us to this discussion. Previous speakers have already mentioned different aspects of the EU and EaP, EU and Azerbaijan relations, various aspects of our cooperation, and so on. As a representative of the Ministry of Economy, I would like to highlight some points regarding the economic dimensions. H. E. Mahmud Mammadgulyev already mentioned that we are strategic partners in energy. From the Azerbaijani perspective the key sector of our economy is gas and oil. Azerbaijani energy projects are directed towards European markets. We have launched Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum and today we are discussing the Southern Gas Corridor project, which includes major components like TANAP, TAP and SCPS. From the economic perspective alone, Azerbaijan can already be a strategic partner for the EU. If we evaluate last year's figures (2014) only 47% of our foreign trade turnover was with EU countries. Therefore, our main trade partners are EU countries. On the other hand, according to figures from the last ten years, more than 51% of total foreign investments to Azerbaijan economy have come from EU countries. In the non-oil sector the figure is more than 35%. Thus, EU countries are also key investors in the Azerbaijani economy. Therefore, energy is not the only sector where we should develop our strategic partnership; our strategic partnership should cover all aspects of the economy.

First of all, what Azerbaijan needs and wants is to bring the EU's highest

standards to the country. And from that perspective we greatly appreciate cooperation programs with EU Neighborhood Policy instruments. Azerbaijan actively participates in EaP and ENP instruments with budget support and through other projects with the EU. Azerbaijan's pipelines include more than 35 projects, which is the biggest number for the region. Georgia and Armenia achieved much less. These projects are the key instruments for development. From this perspective we have already finalized 20 projects, and the remainder are ongoing. Azerbaijani projects have been selected among the most successful projects across all the EP countries over the past several years, demonstrating the willingness of the Azerbaijani side to cooperate with the EU and bring their best experience to Azerbaijan.

From this perspective we look forward for future cooperation and we believe that these instruments will allow us to harmonize our legislation and administrative practices with EU best practices. We have adopted a legal approximation action plan that includes more than 120 legal acts of Azerbaijan in regard to over 140 EU directives. These include all aspects of the economy, from energy to transportation, logistics, and all other fields. All these factors show Azerbaijan's willingness to move towards EU standards. The figures that I have mentioned regarding investment and foreign trade show the extent to which Azerbaijan is willing to cooperate with the EU in the economic field.

The key projects of Azerbaijan are the

Southern Gas Corridor and BTC. These are the future of Azerbaijan, because we call BTC the Contract of the Century for Azerbaijan, and the Southern Gas corridor is the contract of the 21st century for Azerbaijan. Today, the diversification of the economy is on our agenda and we have achieved numerous results in this regard. I will just mention that in 2007 more than 60% of our economy was dependent on the oil and gas sector. Today this figure has dropped to 41%. Today 60% of GDP is generated by the non-oil sector. In addition, we see major potential for cooperation with EU countries in this regard.

DISCUSSION

[Mrs. Gulshan Pashayeva,](#)
[Deputy Director of Center for Strategic Studies](#)

Thank you very much. This was a very interesting discussion and I would like to ask two questions. First, as mentioned we should be very careful regarding the ongoing conflicts in the region, and this question is about more general perspectives. It will be interesting to hear answers from our colleagues from Latvia. When we compare these prolonged conflicts with recent Ukraine events, we can see that security is a common problem for all these countries. From this perspective, solutions do not depend on specific countries, but are related to international actors, specifically Russia and the EU, because these 6 countries are located between these two regional actors. In that sense, I am interested in a broader perspective. What about a

rapprochement between the EU and Russia? Do you think that a rapprochement could lead to the solution of the ethno-territorial conflicts in this region in the near future?

The second question is related to the EU and the US. As mentioned, the EU doesn't really have a single unified foreign policy. The countries that are newly involved in this region have different ideas about the EaP. And what about the US, which has its own relationship with the EU, as Ambassador Pashayev mentioned.

Mr. Juris Poikans:

Thank you very much for this question. Let me start with the US, and I think my American colleague will confirm that we are closely coordinating our approach. I think we both share the vision of a stable and prosperous European neighborhood. Even if we have some differences on how to achieve our strategic goals, both the EU and US are interested in improving relations with Azerbaijan and Ukraine, and in stabilizing the situation in Ukraine. It is the same when it comes to frozen conflicts. As a result, I think the level of cooperation and the level of coordination between the EU and US is very high. Sometimes when you look from the Russian perspective there are some attempts to create rifts there, but in general this is an overstatement.

On the first question, we understand Azerbaijan's concerns about Nagorno-Karabakh, and as I already mentioned,

there should be consensus-based decision making in the EU. This would mean that when it comes to Nagorno-Karabakh, or a conflict in South Ossetia or Crimea, you would need to have consensus among all the countries. If sometimes we don't reach this consensus, it is perceived as an unfair approach on the part of the EU. We have divergent opinions, but we should work on bringing the Azerbaijani perspective on this issue, because Latvia is not going to change the position of individual EU member states. We must be realistic about how the EU is functioning, because sometimes we perceive EU as a single actor, but in fact, we have different perspectives and different institutions. When it comes to Latvia's special position on Nagorno-Karabakh, we have signed several presidential-level declarations. Thus, we have stated our position and we are working hard to bring this position to EU. I think we must work together as Latvia and Azerbaijan to demonstrate that this issue should be resolved.

I think Brussels and various EU capitals understand that the current status of the conflict is not sustainable and that solutions should be reached.

Amb. Hafiz Pashayev:

What about the rapprochement between EU and Russia?

Mr. Juris Poikans:

I think every conflict in the post-Soviet area, has its own dynamics. I have been

in Transnistria, because we usually think of it as the easiest conflict to solve. There you have some traffic on the Dniester River, and people traveling from Kishinev to Tiraspol, but you also have different entities that have emerged there during these years and it's clear that they are financially and politically supported by Russia. So as a result, we have had little success in solving this problem. It could be viewed as a sort of test case, to see if we can reach a solution. But when you look at Moldova, you have this 5+2 negotiation. When you have the EU and Russia at the same table, there is no progress, because the sides have such different perspectives. How can we reach a solution? In the case of Moldova, I believe, Russia will favor a federalist solution, while as the EU we will be happy to allow them to decide themselves. So I wouldn't put a lot of emphasis on how the EU and Russia or the EU and US could agree on something beyond those conflicts. We can facilitate, we can offer the venue, but the solution should be reached between the conflict parties.

Mr. Andris Spruds:

There are various perspectives on the fragility of the region. I think it would be an overstatement to say that there are countries that use EaP countries as playing fields for their own ambitions. I think it's an exaggeration that some say Eastern partners are players in the game and that the South Caucasus is just a zone of interest of Turkey, Russia, Iran, the US, etc. I think the South Caucasus nations are able to maneuver and

manipulate, and this entails skillful diplomacy. In my opinion, Azerbaijan demonstrates excellent examples of this. Despite the geopolitical fragility, various challenges and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it has developed successfully, modernized its economy, and become a largely sustainable state. When it comes to Nagorno-Karabakh, I think the EU can do more on that and place greater emphasis on the liberation of occupied territories, support for IDPs, etc. At the same time, it is not only the EU that bears responsibility but also the stakeholders of the region. Some may say that both Azerbaijan and Armenia think that time is on their side, whereas others would say that time is on neither side and there is a risk that the conflict will escalate.

On the EU and Russia issue, I would like to use the concept that is sometimes used in relation to the US - indispensable nation. I think Russia is an indispensable nation and partner in the region. I would like to see win-win engagement with Russia. I think there is an opportunity for cooperation - but let's not be naïve, because what has happened in Ukraine has undermined some of the trust and willingness for engagement. We would like to see mutually positive engagement, but this seems like a challenge.

Concerning the United States, I would like to add that the Baltic countries believe that US engagement is very important in stabilizing our region. There might be different perceptions on the role of the EU, but at the same time the

EU and US are important players, and conflict resolution requires a broad perspective.

Amb. Hafiz Pashayev:

Thank you, any other questions?

Mr. Cavid Veliyev,
Head of Foreign Policy Analysis
Department at Center for Strategic
Studies (SAM):

I have a few short questions for our colleagues from Latvia. It would be interesting to hear your thoughts on Armenia-EU cooperation, because as we know last year there were discussions about an EU-Armenia Association Agreement. What kind of cooperation are you planning to maintain with Armenia?

Mr. Juris Poikans:

Yes, you are correct. As I have mentioned, as of 2013 Armenia decided to abandon negotiations on the Association Agreement. Already a year and a half has passed, and the EU is expecting suggestions from Armenia on how they would like to proceed. In the absence of an Association Agreement, perhaps Armenia will pursue an agreement that does not include the free trade area element. I don't know how this new agreement will be constructed. In general, Brussels wants to avoid running into the same difficulties as in 2013. We would like to understand how far Armenia is ready to go in relations with the EU, given their membership in the Eurasian Economic

Union. I think we should avoid focusing exclusively on formats or agreements, and emphasize strategic relations.

Amb. Hafiz Pashayev:

We will take two more questions.

Cody Schultz,
Exchange student at ADA University:

I am Cody Schultz, an exchange student from Michigan State University, studying here at ADA. And my question is: in light of the recent situation in Ukraine, with people torn between the European Union and Russia, and the degree to which Russia has been willing to interfere with domestic affairs, do you think that there are some positive economic changes through which Ukraine stands to benefit?

Mr. Juris Poikans:

The EU was never going to fight Russia in the countries of Eastern Partnership, so we never saw this in competitive terms. We never wanted to get the conditional economic legacy of the country's peaceful partnership with Russia. Our trade with Russia actually has dramatically increased when we became partners of the European Union. So we didn't see any contradiction in that. But it is true that Russia has a different perception of this. So it might be true that bilateral relations between the European Union and Ukraine are different to EU-Moldova or EU-Georgia relations. Due to the crisis, the EU has had to adapt its economic and political perspectives on Ukraine. Indeed, there

are different views on how trade flows might change this situation. From the European perspective, the Eastern Partnership has neither succeeded nor failed. Through the Association Agreement framework, the EU has undertaken commitments towards Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova have undertaken responsibilities in terms of transforming their economies, and the EU also has a responsibility to assist them in this process. I agree with you that the EU must be more active in implementing its obligations of support. If the implementation of these agreements is successful, and there is change on the ground, for ordinary people in these countries, this will be a marker of success for the Eastern Partnership. Currently they are somewhere in the middle - half of the countries connected by the agreement have a comprehensive free-trade area in the region with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. The EU must provide stronger support for these countries to modernize.

Amb. Hafiz Pashayev:

Thank you. Now to the very last question.

**Mr. Jeyhun Osmanly,
MP of Azerbaijani Parliament:**

I have two questions, and perhaps recommendations for the next discussion. My first question: what concrete actions and measures does the EU have in regard to countries that use European Commission grants in a way that does not fit with the interests of the European Union? For example, the European

Commission gave Armenia a grant to reconstruct and renovate the Custom Border Union, and then Armenia left the Customs Union. The second question - what do you think about the future of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, and what measures can be taken to make the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly more visible and more productive.

Mr. Juris Poikans:

When it comes to the Euronest Parliament Assembly, we want to see a platform for cooperation between the parliaments of Eastern Partnership countries and the EU. I agree, there have been some problems in the past - the Russian delegation is not participating - but, all in all, we would like to see a real platform for exchanges of opinions, especially different understandings of the Eastern Partnership. When it comes to the first question - it is not always possible to be 100 percent sure how exactly EU money has been used, so there may be many examples where money has been mismanaged, or misused. It is difficult to avoid such situations.

Mr. Andris Sprüds:

The EU security strategy, I think, requires a vision. The slow process of formulating this strategy reveals both the advantages and disadvantages of the EU. It has many countries and it is not easy to reach consensus. But it also has its advantages, because it always accepts more agreements slowly and incrementally. In the context of EU strategy, if we really want to be influential global players, we

start with the neighborhood. So, we first have to engage our neighbors and engage in conflict resolution. But there are limited resources, as well as a security dilemma that is quite abstract at the moment. Therefore, there are difficult choices to make during our presidency. But security sector reform is very important - we should stabilize our borders in engagement with our partners. I don't want to go back to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, because there is the blame game element there. We are all stakeholders in the process, and certainly the EU can do more, but ultimately it is the countries in the region who need to arrive at the final

solution. On Armenia, I am not going to play some sort of blame game. I think that by joining the Customs Union, Armenia has undermined confidence in its relations with the EU. At the same time, we are flexible and pragmatic, and we accept each country's approach. Finally, briefly in regard to the parliament, it is important to mention that this dimension needs to be strengthened, because in the end this is about people-to-people diplomacy, civil society, and expert engagement. This is a very important dimension in enriching the whole Eastern Partnership beyond the purely governmental engagement.

FORTY YEARS AGO: FORD AND BREZHNEV GO TO HELSINKI

JOHN J. MARESCA

John J. Maresca is a former United States Ambassador who was the Deputy Head of the US Delegation for the negotiation of the CSCE's Final Act, signed at a Europe-wide summit in Helsinki in 1975, as well as the Head of the US Delegation which negotiated the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, signed at a similar Europe-wide summit in Paris in 1990. In view of this year's 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, and 25th anniversary of the Charter of Paris, Maresca is publishing this year his unique personal memoirs of the negotiations leading to these two historic documents, and the events which surrounded them. This article is an excerpt from that book, in advance of its publication.

FORTY YEARS AGO: FORD AND BREZHNEV GO TO HELSINKI



REMARKS BY JOHN J. MARESCA

President Gerald Ford signed the Final Act on behalf of the United States on August 1, 1975, just one year after he had been sworn in as President, following Richard Nixon's resignation on August 8, 1974. In doing this Ford followed the script developed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Nixon, which had been agreed with the NATO allies during a long consultation process, and was intended to open more dialogue and cooperation with the Soviet Union. But Ford may not have had in mind the full scope and complexity of the

relationship with Moscow which Nixon and Kissinger had imagined, which included also planned agreements on nuclear and conventional military forces. These elements together formed a strategic agenda, which had to be seen and understood as a whole. Ford's later stumble in responding to a reporter's question on Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, in a televised debate with Jimmy Carter during their race for the Presidency, may have cost him the Presidential election in 1976. Ford was gaining ground in the polls, and might have won, had he not asserted that Eastern Europe was not dominated by the Soviet Union. Even the moderator of

this nationally-televised debate was visibly surprised by this statement.

I recently reviewed that episode of the Ford-Carter debate, on the web, and even now, years later, it looks deeply embarrassing. Ironically, it may have been Ford's participation in the Helsinki Summit which led him to argue so boldly (and of course wrongly at that time) that Russia did not dominate Eastern Europe. Ford later explained that he meant the Poles did not accept Russian domination, but the damage was done. It was a close election, and certainly this episode cost Ford some votes. The American negotiating agenda with the USSR could be justified in terms of its overall balance, but it could not be said that the East European countries were free of Soviet control, nor that the Helsinki Final Act had somehow liberated them. The Soviet grip on Eastern Europe remained, and it would take the slow evolution of time, as well as considerable internal effort by dissidents and opposition groups in each of these countries, for them to break loose of that grip. Polish Americans, and other Americans with origins in the countries of Eastern Europe, strongly resented Soviet dominance of their homelands, and did not forgive Ford for his statement on this matter, which was transmitted by TV, live, across America.

Surely the Final Act, and the process it set in motion, the uses made of it by dissidents, human rights activists and governments over time, and the growing pressures on the Communist governments in the East, played an

important role in the ultimate demise of Communist and Soviet domination in the East. But this was a slow process and was dependent more than anything else on the steady pressures of many elements on the decaying Communist systems which were still in control, but were outmoded and unresponsive to the needs of modern societies. These complex factors made it difficult to oversimplify this process in any analysis or conclusion about the role of the Helsinki Final Act.

The US Delegation went to Helsinki a few weeks after the closure of the CSCE's two year Stage II negotiations in Geneva for the summit-level conference and signing ceremony, and once again I was included as the junior member, this time in support of President Gerald Ford. Arthur Hartman, the gracious and intelligent Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, introduced me to Ford and Kissinger in the Conference hall, saying that I was "the only American who understood all the issues, and all their linkages, throughout this negotiation." This might sound exaggerated to the layman, but as Hartman knew at the time, it was true. Kissinger's humorous but somewhat disparaging response was that "it was a good thing somebody did." But I think he meant it as a compliment, and he referred to that moment on several occasions when I met him in later years, in very different contexts.

In any case the key substantive issue, and the agreement which made the summit-level signing of the Helsinki Final

Act possible, had been resolved privately between Kissinger himself, who was essentially negotiating on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. So for Kissinger that key language was what the conference was all about. He even famously spoke disparagingly on one occasion about a negotiation which was focused and depended entirely on "the placement of commas." This was of course a reference to the language in the Final Act which preserved the possibility of peaceful changes in frontiers in Europe, thereby keeping the door open for eventual German reunification. Kissinger's personal negotiating role had focused, precisely, on the placement of the commas in this key sentence.

The FRG would not have been able to agree to the Final Act without preserving the possibility of peaceful changes in frontiers, while the key Soviet objective in the conference was exactly the opposite: to fix forever the existing division of Germany – and Europe – so that it could never be changed. These were the stakes in this landmark negotiation, and they were very high: would Europe evolve and change over time, or would it remain divided, with Germany split into two sovereign countries, forever? The language agreed between Kissinger and Gromyko finessed this issue, left the door open for peaceful change, and made agreement on the Final Act possible. The peaceful reunification of Germany did indeed take place, many years later – very specifically permitted by this key language, and thus changed the course of modern history.

Of course, as I noted in the opening

sentences of my 1985 book on the CSCE negotiations, "To Helsinki," all things do change, and nothing ever remains the same. So Brezhnev's life objective – to fix forever the permanent division of Germany and Europe – was ultimately a futile illusion, which showed just how illusory it was when the Berlin wall came down, when the Communist governments of Eastern Europe collapsed and were removed from office, and when even the Soviet Union itself was dissolved, in the early 1990's. By then Europe had, indeed, completely changed.

Did the Helsinki Final Act play a role in the evolution which led to that dramatic denouement, years later? Yes, unquestionably it did, if only by encouraging the dissidents in the USSR, and what was then called Eastern Europe, to agitate and demand the freedoms which were so visibly available in the West. The process took some time, but it was a steady movement toward peaceful change, and in the end it was very decisive, in fact unstoppable.

So the preservation of the possibility of peaceful changes in frontiers in Europe, as well as the modest openings offered for freer movement of people and ideas, and the guiding principles contained in the Final Act, became important beacons, beyond what any of us in the conference could possibly have imagined as we were immersed in that tedious, complicated and many-faceted negotiating process. These features have given the Final Act its historic importance, and its place among the guiding documents for Europe at the close of the twentieth century.

My impressions of the ceremonies which accompanied the signing of the Final Act by all the Heads of State or Government of Europe and North America, in Helsinki in the summer of 1975, are reflected to some extent in my 1985 book, "To Helsinki". Attitudes at the time of that signing ceremony were very much a mix of support and opposition, suspicion and perplexity, based on incomplete or oversimplified information on the significance of the Final Act, what it was about, what it contained, and why it was important. How could it be explained in simple terms? We who were a part of those negotiations speculated and wondered about the future significance of the Final Act, just as much as anyone else. And the truth is that we did not know. It was the dissidents in the USSR and Eastern Europe who picked it up and made it into their instrument, their rallying cry, their lever for opening up the closed systems in the East. Very simply, it became a symbol for what Europe could become – a free and open space, with all its many national identities, stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, and beyond.

In the United States there was at first considerable hostility toward the Final Act – the negotiations had not attracted much attention, because they were held at a low level and were overshadowed by other events. Also, the public had not been prepared, as usually happens before such high-level signature events, through a process of governmental explanation of why the issue is so important, etc. So when it was announced that President Ford would travel to Helsinki to sign something called a "Final Act" there was a considerable amount of questioning and cynicism, even ridicule. The

Wall Street Journal, in particular, urged in a front-page headline "Gerry, Don't Go," based on its quick reading of the matter as a give-away to the Soviet Union of official recognition of its dominance over Eastern Europe, as well as the permanent division of Europe, and many other negative implications.

Years later the Journal retracted and apologized for this headline. It recognized then that the Final Act was positive for the West, and for the eventual unraveling of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. This was one of the few times in its history that the Wall Street Journal has publicly retracted a position it has taken. And in this case it was on a fundamental historical turning point, which many people misunderstood and got wrong. The Helsinki Final Act opened the doors, and the dissidents, and activists on all sides picked it up and ran with it, with the effects over time which we can now plainly see.

But at the time there were mixed feelings all around, and many intellectuals and commentators, both in Europe and in the United States, did not agree that the bargain which had been struck between the West and the Soviets was a good one that would be positive for Eastern Europe. As a result, the mood at the summit-level conference, which should have been celebratory, impressed me as one of muted disappointment and caution. No one was really over-joyed by the results, and even the speeches of the heads of state were reserved. The notable exception was that of Brezhnev, who spoke as though the Final Act was a Soviet triumph, and thus fed the doubts of observers in the West. The mood

in the streets of Helsinki was particularly cool – the crowds along the sidewalks simply stood there and watched – no cheering, no flag waving, no smiles. Significantly, they did not know whether to understand this unique high-level meeting as a positive step for them, for the West, and for Europe, or a negative one. Only time would tell.

And the speeches were reserved – everything depended on whether commitments were carried out, and that would only become known much later. So there was a sense – at best – of suspension of judgment, to see what would actually happen.

The working delegates, who had carried out these negotiations, were invited to a dinner at an estate deep in the Finnish forest, and, as I described in “To Helsinki,” they speculated about what would happen now. But most of them were off to other assignments, and were happy to be out of this long and tedious negotiating process. They were, after all, professional diplomats.

Looking back now and re-reading Brezhnev's Helsinki speech, with its ringing: “the hour has struck for the inevitable collective conclusions to be drawn from the experience of history,” one can only think: How wrong he was.

* * *



Europe During the Cold War, at the time of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act (1975)

25 YEARS AFTER THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL: HOW GLOBAL POLITICS HAVE CHANGED

BORIS TADIĆ

Boris Tadić was the President of Serbia from 2004 to 2012. During this time, he was also Leader of the Democratic Party, and is now its Honorary President. He previously served as the Yugoslavian Minister of Telecommunications (2000 - 2003) and as the Minister of Defence of Serbia and Montenegro from (2003 - 2004). As President, he submitted Serbia's application to join the European Union, and secured Serbian membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace program.

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Europe After the Reunification of Germany (1990)

MODERATOR'S INTRODUCTION **AMBASSADOR HAFIZ PASHAYEV**

Good afternoon everybody.
Ladies, gentlemen, faculty, students, guests
and distinguished diplomats,

I welcome all of you to ADA University. It is an honour and a pleasure for us to host His Excellency Boris Tadic, former President of Serbia. This event is being hosted within the newly established Center for EU Studies of ADA University. Our guest speaker, Boris Tadić, was Serbia's Head of State from 2004 to 2012,

having been elected to this post twice. Prior to that, he served as Serbia's Minister of Telecommunications and as Minister of Defence for Serbia and Montenegro. President Tadic was known for his advocacy for Serbia's integration into the European Union, as well as his balanced approach towards Russia and the United States of America.

Today, Boris Tadic will speak about global politics 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This topic is both interesting and very timely given current developments in Ukraine and the general context of the European security

architecture. We look forward to these remarks, and before passing the floor to our distinguished guest, I would like just briefly to inform you that we have a very diverse student body and faculty at our University. We have students from 32 countries. This diversity enriches our academic environment, helping us to develop our understanding of global politics not just through books, but also through an intensive and continuous dialogue between students and faculty. In fact, we have four students from Serbia. For them it is a great pleasure to be meeting you here today in Baku, and I am sure that they will remember this day for the rest of their lives.

Your Excellency, I welcome you once again. Thank you for coming. The floor is yours.

REMARKS BY BORIS TADIĆ

Dear Rector Pashayev, students, ladies and gentlemen,

It is my great pleasure to talk to you today at ADA University about the challenges that we are facing 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In particular, I am pleased to be delivering this speech in Baku, in Azerbaijan, a friend and strategic partner country of Serbia. This year marks a quarter of a century since the fall of communism in Eastern and Central Europe. Unfortunately, today we must address the risk of the revival of Cold War paradigms.

This is a real threat and we must put all of our energy and strength into preventing this revival from taking place.

Over the past 25 years, Europe and the United States have failed to reach

consensus with Russia on the necessity of creating a joint living space based on shared values, and also common security concerns. This is partly our fault; the fall of the Berlin Wall was celebrated as a victory over the Soviet Union rather than as a new joint beginning. The lesson of the Marshall Plan for Germany after the World War II was clear: after you defeat your opponent, you should try to build a democratic society. This approach was sadly not replicated in the relationship between the West and Russia after the end of Cold War. If we are isolated, we cannot help to advance democracy in Russia, or any other country or region.

The Ukraine crisis has marked the end of the old security architecture in Europe. Clearly, we need to construct a new one, perhaps by trying to negotiate a security charter that would include Europe, Russia and the US, possibly under the auspices of the OSCE. The first step would be to try to create a joint economic space including energy flow with as few barriers possible.

EU enlargement: the Balkans and Serbia

Today as much as ever, Europe must continue to express solidarity within and outside Europe, and to demonstrate the political vision and courage to finally complete the EU enlargement process. The Ukraine crisis has clearly demonstrated the necessity of putting aside the so-called 'enlargement fatigue', in order to finally fulfill the historic vision of a single Europe, united and free. If this opportunity is missed,

other powerful players will quickly fill the ensuing vacuum. It is clearer than ever that further EU enlargement is not only dependent on political will and the capabilities of prospective members to implement the necessary reforms, but also on the EU's readiness to extend peace, prosperity and stability throughout the continent. The EU integration process has been a major driving force for reforms, regional cooperation, and reconciliation among the Balkan countries.

When the EU leaders met at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, they promised the Western Balkan states that they would eventually become members of the EU. The idea was perfect; to accelerate reforms by providing EU membership perspectives to the region. That promise has been the anchor for Serbia's vision of its political future. We have always believed that our geography, history, political culture and economy make us a natural part of Europe. Considering the recent history of the Balkans, and Serbia's role, along with the significant contribution of modern democratic Serbia to reconciliation in the region, we believed that EU membership would cement our role as a guarantor of stability and peace, and stimulate economic regeneration of the Balkans.

Today, we are still hopeful that the EU will honor its commitment [to Serbia's membership]. Within the process of European integration, we expected Serbia to be treated just like all other

aspiring countries. We never asked for any preferential treatment or shortcuts.

However, we have on a number of occasions been asked [by the EU] to fulfill new conditions or provide political concessions. As soon as we fulfil those conditions, new ones suddenly appear, delaying our progress toward EU membership. For example, in 2011, when Serbia arrested the last war criminal, General Mladic, and transferred him to the Hague Tribunal on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, the European Commission praised the reform process and thus recommended to members states that we be granted candidate status. However, several member states delayed this process for a few months, arguing that the resolution of the highly complex Kosovo issue should be precondition for Serbia's accession to the EU.

These unfair and artificial delays in the integration process are jeopardizing and slowing down both reforms in Serbia and the reconciliation process in the broader Balkan region. Serbia officially began accession negotiations with the EU in January 2014, after signing the so-called Brussels Agreement with the Kosovo-Albania leadership. Despite this, negotiations are proceeding slowly, and there are thirty-five chapters to be completed in order for Serbia to become a member of the EU.¹ In this context, Serbia's best case scenario is EU

1 There are 35 chapters in the negotiating document that Serbia will have to close before it can obtain membership. The chapters cover practically all aspects of administration, from tax policy to fishing, regulation, security, culture and education. Each must be opened and closed by the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU, which unites the foreign ministers of all 28 member states.

membership after another ten years. We understand that for the EU there are more urgent issues than enlargement, especially now, when it is facing a number of internal problems, including the Eurozone crisis. However, I strongly believe that the only way for the EU to fully reach its potential as a global player is to complete the enlargement process with candidate countries.

The EU's Approach to Eastern Partnership countries

The Ukraine crisis has raised awareness within the EU of the failures of the current approach towards Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries: Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Belarus, as there is no consensus on what should change. There are still no membership perspectives for these countries, nor is the EU willing to provide rapid cash transfers or major economic support to those countries.

Meanwhile, NATO is unwilling to offer membership to countries partially occupied by foreign troops, as is already the case with Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Russia is aware of this unwillingness, and has manipulated those frozen conflicts to this end. The future relations of the EU and US with the so-called Eastern Neighborhood cannot be successfully developed if Russia's interests are threatened, or if it believes they are threatened. There is a need for an agreement or informal formula with Russia in that regard. If the EU is not prepared to provide genuine support to its Eastern neighbors - i.e. the EaP

countries - then it is unrealistic for Brussels to expect full commitment to the Association Agreements and the implementation of reforms. But then these countries need a promise of membership, or the same or similar benefits as Norway or Switzerland.

In regard to security and integration, it is clear that Russia will do anything to prevent any EaP country from joining NATO. At the same time, EaP countries have limited prospects of joining NATO under these circumstances.

Azerbaijan: Future Perspectives

In this context, Azerbaijan is in an interesting position. It is geographically located at the intersection of key trade and economic routes from Central Asia to Europe, and at the point where the interests of major powers clash. I would argue that in the short term, Azerbaijan will benefit from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in regard to its energy interests. Azerbaijan seeks to strengthen its position not only at the regional level, but also as a reliable partner of the West. Importantly, the EU is seeking alternatives to Russian gas. Azerbaijan will also strengthen its geostrategic position, given that NATO military equipment leaving Afghanistan will transit Azerbaijan. Following the delay on Russian-NATO cooperation on Afghanistan, Azerbaijan became the only reliable corridor for withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. The EU faces challenges in regard to diversifying its energy suppliers, and Azerbaijan will play a major role in this process. Aside

from Azerbaijani gas, the delivery of Turkmenistan's gas to Europe is only possible via Azerbaijan. Significant volumes of Iraqi and eventually Iranian gas could reach European consumers through the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) on Turkish territory. Azerbaijan is the major stakeholder in TANAP.

Azerbaijan and Turkey have always had a strategic, some would say fraternal, partnership, but on the other hand, Turkey has always pursued its own regional interests under any circumstances. Azerbaijan is interested in two key aspects of Turkish foreign policy:

The first is Turkey's full support on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as the continued suspension of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia. The second is the secure and reliable delivery of Azerbaijani energy resources to Europe via Turkish territory.

When it comes to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkey does not only provide diplomatic support to Baku, but is also an important strategic partner in ensuring Azerbaijani access to the Black and Mediterranean Seas.

The relationship between Azerbaijan and Iran has taken a very different turn. Although there are nearly 30 million ethnic Azerbaijanis living in Northern Iran, the relationship between Tehran and Baku has grown increasingly tense in recent years. These two countries have been following different paths in their respective foreign policies, pursuing opposing targets in terms of future

development. In the field of energy, Iran strongly opposes the construction of a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.

Moving closer toward EU integration does not seem a priority for either the policymakers or wider society in Azerbaijan, unlike Georgia and Moldova, where full European integration is a goal of the government and a central pillar of public debate. Azerbaijan did not sign an Association Agreement with the EU at the EaP Vilnius Summit in November 2013. The Azerbaijani government seeks a relationship with the EU based on strengthening its importance as an energy supplier and a mutually acceptable political reform agenda; Baku has offered the EU a "modernization and strategic partnership agreement", to which Brussels has not yet responded.

Among the CIS countries, Baku is the most independent from Russia in terms of its foreign policy, since Azerbaijan does not rely on Russia's economic assistance or investments; it does not host Russian troops on its territory, nor does it have a large Russian minority. After Russia's annexation of Crimea, Azerbaijan was among the three CIS countries, along with Moldova and Georgia, which voted for the pro-Ukrainian resolution in the United Nations in March 2014.

But despite Azerbaijan's energy cooperation with the EU, Baku still takes Russian interests into account when dealing with Brussels. Notably Russia still has leverage over Baku in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as in regard to

the unresolved status of the Caspian Sea. Thus Russia can prevent the Trans-Caspian pipeline project from being built; this pipeline would deliver huge volumes of Turkmen gas to Europe via Azerbaijan.

In addition, as I mentioned previously, while in the short term Azerbaijan can benefit from the Ukraine-Russia conflict due to energy issues, in the long term these benefits will recede, as Russia could use all possible means to keep Azerbaijan inside its zone of influence. Therefore, a new Cold War is not in the interests of Azerbaijan or any other country in the surrounding regions; for instance, the decline in oil prices is hurting Azerbaijan's economy. In this regard, Azerbaijan will continue to be a partner of the EU, but will not push an anti-Russian policy.

Thank you for your attention; I am ready to answer your questions.

DISCUSSION

Ambassador Hafiz Pashayev,
Rector of ADA University:

Thank you for your impressive remarks. It is clear that you are very knowledgeable about Azerbaijan. I would like to put the first question to you. You mentioned that Europe's old security architecture is collapsing, and that a new security arrangement could emerge within the framework of the OSCE. But the OSCE, especially in the case of Azerbaijan and conflict resolution, seems somewhat weak. I would like to hear your views on the future of the OSCE from this perspective.

Boris Tadić:

First of all, the OSCE is the multilateral institution that we have right now. We have the OSCE ambassador here now. But it is hard to predict the future. We do not have many multilateral institutions functioning in this part of the globe. I agree with you that even the OSCE is not capable right now of resolving such a conflict, i.e., Nagorno-Karabakh, because it is dependent on every single one of its member state governments. This entails a mix of interests, and we see in regard to the Ukraine crisis that those interests do not always align. But when we face this kind of crisis, we also encounter an opportunity to find a new kind of solution. My answer is that the future of the OSCE depends on the future of the global political and economic situation, especially after the Ukraine events.

I attended many international forums just before the Ukraine crisis began. Many political leaders and well-known experts were unable to predict how the Ukraine situation would unfold; on a much larger scale it is supremely difficult to predict what will be happening at a global level in three months. We need institutions that are capable of approaching problems with a courageous vision, but this is impossible without leaders who can solve problems. It is not possible to resolve problems through traditional approaches of military power and aggression.

The world is changing rapidly across the economic, technological and political

spheres, which requires greater innovation. I think the OSCE's next term, under Serbian presidency, can pursue this path. I hope we can succeed, because we need to find a solution to the Ukraine crisis, because the prolongation of the situation can trigger a domino effect in other countries and regions. When Serbia was faced with the Kosovo issue, I was always appealing to my counterparts to consider the possible domino effect. Did they listen? Unfortunately not. They said that Kosovo is a unique case. If we look closely, we can see that every case is unique. But following Kosovo we have seen an increasing number of separatist movements; look what has happened in Ukraine.

Azerbaijan and Serbia have taken very principled positions on this matter. I discussed this issue with President Aliyev. The Kosovo independence declaration was a very difficult time for Serbia, and it brought Baku and Belgrade together in a strategic partnership. Sometimes, crises can bring countries, nations and leaders closer together. I want to emphasize the fact that a crisis also brings new perspectives and new possibilities, not only in terms of bilateral relations, but also in multilateral relations.

In the case of Ukraine, this crisis is highly complex; there are multiple competing viewpoints in play, and many languages and identities are in the mix. We should seek to understand the identity issue from a position of empathy. Serbia is very aware of this issue. Sometimes I struggle to explain this issue to my Western counterparts, who dismiss identity issues as emotional issues. But

Azerbaijan understands the importance of this. This is why I believe that new types of policy approaches are needed, or we will be faced with a very unpredictable and dangerous world.

[Amb. Hafiz Pashayev:](#)

Thank you. I fully agree with your views on the 'domino effect'. At the beginning of the 1990's, as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was starting, we said the same things. The floor is now open for any questions.

[Hasan Shafiee,](#)
[MA student at ADA University:](#)

Can Serbia play a mediating role between two conflicting parties – the West and Russia - in the case of Ukraine? And also, do you believe your country will succeed on its EU integration path?

[Boris Tadić:](#)

States behave like human beings, because behind the states are always humans. This means that states reveal prejudices in their behavior. There are many prejudices between Russia and the United States. If those prejudices become the foundation of the relationship, we will witness a very difficult situation. Prejudice prevents conflict resolution. From that perspective, I am not very optimistic, because we see the effects of those prejudices every day. But if we take a wider perspective – identifying common interests within the bigger picture – we can address these common challenges.

Consider the global economic perspective. Who is going to be the main beneficiary of discord between the West and Russia? China. I always oppose the use of sanctions, and the current sanctions against Russia are endangering its stability. Russia is a big country, with huge oil and gas reserves. Destroying the Russian economy means that everyone will suffer, even the US. Serbia will also face challenges in this scenario.

Frankly, what Russia is doing in Ukraine is a mistake. If Russia and the US do not take a wider perspective, both sides will suffer.

Rashad Ibadov,
Associate Professor of ADA University:

Thank you for sharing your views. I have two questions. First, in regard to Russia's decision to abandon the South Stream project, what are your predictions? Who will suffer most? Second, I have a question about Turkey's presence in the Balkans. Do Balkan countries fear a Turkish presence in the region? Do you think that Turkey can play a particular role in the security and economies of the Balkan region?

Boris Tadić:

The abandoning of the South Stream is understandable. I had concerns from the start. Serbia supported this project, because we do not have many alternatives and energy lies at the heart of politics. I hope that Serbia will join the Southern Corridor, but I do not understand why the

Serbian government has not yet started negotiations with Azerbaijan about buying gas via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline project. Unfortunately, the Southern Corridor will not pass through Serbian territory. The route was mainly selected for economic reasons. But TAP is going through Southern Italy and to the Puglia region,² where there was local opposition to the development of the pipeline. Is this rational? No. But we must take into consideration the link between energy and politics, and this local protest shows that foreign influence is a factor.

I do not believe that we have seen the last of the South Stream project. The EU needs huge volumes of gas and Russia has this capacity. The conflict in Ukraine also increases the importance of bypassing Ukraine territory. This is diversification, and not only of suppliers, but also of location.

Turkey is a very important player in the Balkan region, as a member of NATO and a major contributor of troops to the Alliance; traditionally it has had influence over Balkan affairs. Moreover, Turkey is an important country in the Middle East, with interests in Turkic speaking regions, from China to the Western Balkans. This so-called "Ottoman area" is very much the focus of modern Turkish politics, and one of the proponents of this policy is the current Prime Minister, Ahmed Davutoglu. I know him very well and we have a very good relationship. Ahmed Davutoglu is a main driving force in empowering Turkey to play a new role in global policy. Turkey wants to

2 The southern Italian region of Puglia initially opposed plans to bring Azerbaijani gas to Italy via the TAP pipeline project. Local authorities cited environmental concerns. Later, the Italian government approved the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), dismissing local opposition.

spread its influence beyond Turkish-speaking areas to other countries, such as Somalia. Turkey has an important role regarding Islam. Religious radicalization is a global threat and Turkey plays a critical role in tackling this problem.

It is true that some countries in the Balkans fear Turkish influence, but some countries support Ankara's role. In the Balkans, Bosniaks and Albanians support Turkish influence. Serbs, Croats, and Montenegrins are more concerned about Turkish influence, because their historical experience with Turkey has not always been positive.

As President, I tried to build a strategic relationship with Turkey. My political opponents criticized me for this. We must have good relations with a reliable, strong and credible Islamic country, because Islam has a strong presence in the Balkan region. We cannot isolate our Islamic people from that kind of influence. With its knowledge of the region and its established relations with Euro-Atlantic institutions, Turkey is the best political strategic partner in that context.

Question from auditorium:

Azerbaijan did not recognize the independence of Karabakh. Do you think Azerbaijan's attitude towards the recognition of Kosovo's independence could change if the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be resolved?

Boris Tadić:

I do not think Azerbaijan is going to

recognize the independence of Kosovo, not only because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but on the basis of the principled position that Azerbaijan's President and government have taken. If Serbia recognizes Kosovo's independence in the future, the Azerbaijan government might recognize Kosovo's independence. But I hope that Serbia is not going to do that - given considerations of international law. My conviction is that Kosovo does not belong to Kosovo's Albanians. If we create that kind of precedent, we will face many conflicts and wars.

Fariz Ismailzade, Vice-Rector of ADA University:

None of us in this room knows what it is like to be a Head of State. How have you adapted since leaving the presidency?

Boris Tadić:

I'll pose another question in response - after being elected to the presidency, how did I adapt? It is important to understand the nature of your responsibilities. I often talked with my father, a former dissident and philosopher in Yugoslavia and Serbia, who had been a member of the so-called Praxis group, which was a left-leaning philosophy group. Some people named him as a possible presidential candidate in Serbia in the 1990's, to run against Milosevic. My father said, "If the country appoints me as a presidential candidate, then this country is not thinking about its future - because I am philosopher. I cannot adapt myself to a political role." He made this statement via the public media. He said this in 1992, and I became president of Serbia in 2004. I had

not even considered running for the Presidency, but the people chose me. I was not part of the political elite; I lived among dissidents. It was very hard to adapt to having so much power in my hands. My advice to those who want to run for office is that you should only follow this path if you are sure that you are capable of managing

power in a responsible manner.

[Amb. Hafiz Pashayev:](#)

Thank you for your lecture and for coming to ADA University. I would like to present you with a medal from our University.

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